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PLURAL MARRIAGE AND 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 
 DIANE J. KLEIN∗ 
Plural marriage makes strange bedfellows.  Fundamentalist Mor-
mons, polyamorous/polyfidelitous sex radicals, and some feminists and 
proponents of same-sex marriage (including this author), share the view 
that freedom of intimate association under the United States Constitution, 
properly understood, must extend beyond the right to marry exactly one 
person of the opposite gender from oneself.  But while it is one thing to 
endorse marriage freedom, as a matter of principle, it is quite another ac-
tually to implement it in law.  If people could simultaneously have more 
than one spouse, the lawyer must ask, how would things actually work, 
from a marital property perspective?  What would happen when someone 
died or got divorced?  A community property state1 that recognized plu-
ral marriage would need to adopt new rules for the division of marital 
property upon the death or divorce of a multiply married person, and the 
creation of suitable new rules requires not just minor changes of law, but 
the introduction of new marital property concepts.2  Nevertheless, these 
 
∗ Diane J. Klein, A.B. Harvard-Radcliffe College, J.D. UCLA School of Law, is a Visiting 
Professor of Law at Stetson University Law School (2010-2011).  This Article was presented in draft 
form at the 2009 Estate Planning, Probate & Trust Law Symposium, “Emerging Issues in Estate 
Planning, Probate, & Trust Law,” held at Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern Uni-
versity, Houston, Texas, March 26, 2009.  It was also presented at the Southern California Junior 
Law Faculty Workshop, held at California Western School of Law, in 2009.  The Author thanks par-
ticipants and audience members at both events, especially Prof. Michael Wu of California Western 
School of Law, for their very helpful comments; all errors are her own. 
 1 The community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.  Additionally, under the Alaska Community Property 
Act, spouses can agree to have some or all of their property classified and treated as community 
property.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.77.010-34.77.995.  Alaska is not considered a community prop-
erty state for purposes of this Article. 
 2 There are also important questions about the management of community property during 
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revisions are manageable and fundamentally in keeping with the com-
munity property theory of marriage.  These new concepts, and model 
statutes that employ them,  are the subject of this Article. 
INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental liberty interest in the right to marry has unques-
tionably been established since at least the nineteenth century.3  In 1888, 
the Supreme Court described marriage as “the most important relation in 
life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people 
than any other institution . . . without which there would be neither civi-
lization nor progress.”4  In 1965, Justice Goldberg described marriage as 
“a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization.”5  The 
Supreme Court has held that the United States Constitution protects 
“[w]ithout doubt . . . the right of the individual to . . .  marry, establish a 
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of 
his own conscience.”6  In the past half-century, the Supreme Court has 
said that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men,”7 and that “it is clear that among the decisions that an individual 
may make without unjustified government interference are personal deci-
sions relating to marriage.”8  More recently, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the 
Court said, 
[T]he decision to marry has been placed on the same level of impor-
tance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and 
family relationships. . . . [I]t would make little sense to recognize a 
right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not 
with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the founda-
tion of the family in our society.9 
The Constitution may protect this fundamental freedom, but every-
 
the marriage of plurally married people, as well as creditors’ rights.  These issues will be addressed 
in a future Article. 
 3 See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
 4 Id. at 205, 211. 
 5 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 6 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 7 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 8 Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 9 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). 
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where, marriage is in chains.  Bigamy is currently illegal in every state,10 
outlawed by the state constitutions of five states,11 and same-sex mar-
riage is permitted in just five states and the District of Columbia.12  For 
as long as the Supreme Court has praised marriage, polygamy (as plural 
marriage is typically referred to) has been subjected to a steady stream of 
obloquy and opprobrium in the courts.13  The United States Supreme 
Court has called it an “offence against society,”14 that “tend[s] to destroy 
the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to de-
 
 10 See Appendix: Laws Against Bigamy. 
 11 ARIZ. CONST. art. 20, para. 2 (“Polygamous or plural marriages, or polygamous cohabita-
tion, are forever prohibited within this State.”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4 (“Bigamy and polygamy are 
forever prohibited in the state, and the legislature shall provide by law for the punishment of such 
crimes.”); N.M. CONST. art. 21, § 1 (“Polygamous or plural marriages and polygamous cohabitation 
are forever prohibited.”); OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“Polygamous or plural marriages are forever 
prohibited.”); UTAH CONST. ENABLING ACT, art. 3 (“[P]olygamous or plural marriages are forever 
prohibited.”). 
 12 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-1m (Westlaw 2010); D.C. CODE § 46-401 (Westlaw 
2010); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding that IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2, 
which limited marriage to a union between a man and a woman, was unconstitutional); Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that regardless of gender, any two oth-
erwise qualified individuals can get married in Massachusetts); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:4 
(Westlaw 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (Westlaw 2010).  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 
(Cal. 2008), established the right of same-sex couples to marry in California.  This case was over-
turned by Proposition 8 in November, 2009, which enshrined opposite-sex marriage in the California 
Constitution; Proposition 8 was declared unconstitutional in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 
2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); that decision in turn was stayed pending appeal by Perry v. Schwarzeneg-
ger, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).  Four states and the District of Columbia make 
“domestic partnership” available to same-sex couples. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 297.5 (Westlaw 
2010); D.C. CODE §§ 32-701 (defining domestic partners), 32-702 (domestic partnership registration 
and termination procedures); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (Westlaw 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
22, § 2710 (Westlaw 2010) (establishing domestic partnership registry); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 
1-201(10-A) (Westlaw 2010) (defining domestic partner); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.300 (Westlaw 
2010); 2007 Wash. Legis. Serv. 156 S.S.B. 5336 (Westlaw 2010) (establishing domestic partner reg-
istry).  Another four offer “civil unions.” See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38aa, 46b-38bb, 46b-
38oo (Westlaw 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1, 457-A:6 (Westlaw 2010); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 26:8A-1 (Westlaw 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201, 1202, 1204(a)-(b) (Westlaw 
2010). New Jersey maintains a domestic partner registry as well. See Domestic Partnership, N.J. 
DEPT OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES, http://www.state.nj.us/health/vital/dp2.shtml. 
 13 See, e.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 343 n.6 (1946) (quoting Florida Supreme 
Court, which referred to “polygamy or . . . other doctrines equally obnoxious to approved moral 
standards”); United States v. Darui, 545 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (D. D.C. 2008) (“evidence of polyga-
mous activity is clearly so inflammatory in nature that when its probative value is weighed against 
its obvious prejudicial effect, the evidence is not admissible”); Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 
501, 504 (N.Y. 2008) (noting, in custody dispute after divorce of same-sex partners validly married 
in Canada, that New York will recognize a marriage validly contracted elsewhere unless it is “abhor-
rent to New York public policy”; that “[t]he abhorrence exception is so narrow that it has been ap-
plied only to marriages involving polygamy or incest”; and that New York courts have declined to 
apply the exception to an incestuous uncle-niece marriage) (citing In re May, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 
1953)). 
 14 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878). 
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grade woman, and to debase man,”15 and “leads to the patriarchal princi-
ple . . . which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in 
stationary despotism.”16  Proponents (not just practitioners) of polygamy 
have been barred from voting,17 from holding public office or serving as 
jurors,18 and from being admitted to the United States as immigrants.19  
In at least two states even today, merely teaching about polygamy can be 
against the law.20 
Compelling — and, this author believes, ultimately conclusive — 
arguments can be made as to why our state and federal Constitutions 
should protect the right of all adults to marry very nearly whomever they 
choose.21  The opponents of marriage freedom are correct in closely as-
sociating the legal barriers to same-sex marriage with the barriers to plu-
 
 15 Davis, 133 U.S. at 341. 
 16 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
 17 IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (prior to 1982 amendment); Shepherd v. Grimmet, 31 P. 793 
(Idaho 1892); Wooley v. Watkins, 22 P. 102 (Idaho 1889). 
 18 Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 926 (Utah 1993) (“[T]he Ed-
munds Act disenfranchised polygamists, declared them ineligible for public office, and forbade their 
service on juries.”) (citing Gustive O. Larson, The Crusade and the Manifesto, in UTAH’S HISTORY 
257, 259 (Richard D. Poll et al. eds., 1978)). 
 19 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(10)(A) (Westlaw 2010); Ali v. Reno, 829 F. Supp. 1415 (S.D. N.Y. 
1993) (Egyptian cleric); 22 C.F.R. § 40.101 (Westlaw 2010); see also Dag Ytreberg, 3A C.J.S. 
Aliens § 1201.  Similarly, in Rabia Bibi v. United Kingdom, Application No. 19628/92, a Bangla-
deshi polygamist was denied the right to bring a second wife to Britain under the Immigration Act of 
1988.  The European Commission on Human Rights held that Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights was not violated thereby. 
 20 The states are Michigan and Mississippi. Michigan Compiled Laws Section 750.441, titled 
“Teaching, Soliciting and Advocating the Practice of Polygamy,” provides, “Any person who shall 
solicit to a polygamous life, or teach polygamy as a correct form of family life, for the purpose of 
inducing men and women to enter into the practice of polygamy or advocate the doctrine and prac-
tice of polygamy, or attempt to persuade any person by private or public discourse to adopt a po-
lygamous life, shall be guilty of a felony.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.441 (Westlaw 2010). 
Mississippi Code Section 97-29-43 states, “If any person shall teach another the doctrines, princi-
ples, or tenets, or any of them, of polygamy; or shall endeavor so to do; or shall induce or persuade 
another by words or acts, or otherwise, to embrace or adopt polygamy, or to emigrate to any other 
state, territory, district, or country for the purpose of embracing, adopting, or practicing polygamy, 
or shall endeavor so to do, he shall, on conviction, be fined not less than twenty-five dollars nor 
more than five hundred dollars, or be imprisoned in the county jail not less than one month nor more 
than six months, or both.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-43 (Westlaw 2010).  In ROBERT HEINLEIN, 
THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS (1966), Heinlein imagines a twenty-first century civilization on 
the Moon – with an intelligent supercomputer, lunar colonies, space travel – and a plurally married 
protagonist who gets arrested when he visits this planet (“Terra”), where bigamy and polygamy are 
still illegal in 2076 in the former United States, although out of Terra’s “eleven billion people per-
haps seven billion lived where polygamy is legal.”  ROBERT HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH 
MISTRESS 263 (1966). 
 21 Whether, for example, adults should be able to marry (and reproduce) within currently 
prohibited degrees of consanguinity is a question beyond the scope of this Article. 
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ral marriage;22 they err only in seeking to strengthen, rather than abolish, 
those barriers.  Legal recognition of plural marriage, and the included 
case of same-sex marriage, is essential to true marriage freedom.  Every 
person who genuinely supports freedom of intimate association ought to 
support this liberty, even those who do not desire for themselves any but 
the most conventional of unions. 
The constitutional arguments in defense of these views have been 
skillfully made by others.23  Rather than recapitulating or expatiating 
 
 22 Justice Scalia has associated the justification for the denial of civil rights to homosexuals 
with the denial of civil rights to proponents or practitioners of plural marriage, and used both as ex-
amples of social ills.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (identifying as forms of conduct not entitled to constitutional protection “ho-
mosexual sodomy, polygamy, adult incest, and suicide”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (defending Colorado’s Amendment 2, prohibiting antidiscrimination laws in 
protection of homosexuals, by reference to the constitutionality of laws under which “[p]olygamists, 
and those who have a polygamous ‘orientation,’ have been ‘singled out’ by these provisions for 
much more severe treatment” than Amendment 2’s treatment of homosexuals); Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243, 296 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the “naked value judgment” that must 
be made about “the legitimacy of polygamy or eugenic infanticide”).  State responses to Goodridge 
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that regardless of gender, any two 
individuals can get married in Massachusetts), combine same-sex marriage and polygamy as well.  
“[T]he Ohio General Assembly amended Revised Code Section 3101.01” such that “‘[a] marriage 
may only be entered into by one man and one woman’ (thereby expressly foreclosing polygamy as 
well as same-gender unions).” State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547, 551 n.1 (Ohio 2007). 
 23 See, e.g., Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (2006) (questioning policy bases for criminalization of polygamy); 
Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions 
Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691 
(2001) (First Amendment); Kristen A. Berberick, Comment, Marrying into Heaven: The Constitu-
tionality of Polygamy Bans Under the Free Exercise Clause, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 105 (2007) 
(arguing that Utah’s bigamy statute is constitutional, but unconstitutional as applied to religious po-
lygamists who do not seek to have their relationships recognized as legal marriages); David L. 
Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1997); Samantha Slark, 
Study Note, Are Anti-Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement on the Liberty Interests of 
Consenting Adults?, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451 (2004) (privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).  No less a defender of liberty than John Stuart Mill himself remarked, “The article of the 
Mormonite doctrine which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the 
ordinary restraints of religious tolerance[] is its sanction of polygamy; which . . . seems to excite 
unquenchable animosity when practiced by persons who speak English[] and profess to be a kind of 
Christian[].  No one has a deeper disapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution . . . being a 
mere riveting of the chains of one-half of the community, and an emancipation of the other from 
reciprocity of obligation towards them.  Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much 
voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is 
the case with any other form of the marriage institution; . . .[I]t is difficult to see on what principles 
but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living there [in Utah] under what laws they please.”  
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 89-90 (Hackett 1978) (1859).  In dicta, courts have occasionally 
contemplated the possibility that polygamy might at least be “victimless.”  See, e.g., State v. 
Guadagni, 178 P.3d 473, 477 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (“there may be instances in which bigamy is a 
‘victimless crime’-with all parties to a plural marriage fully informed, willing participants, and no 
one’s interests acted against, in any ordinary sense of the word”).  But see Ruth K. Khalsa, Note, 
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upon those arguments, therefore, this Article will address some of the le-
gal-theoretical questions of marriage law raised by plural marriage, and 
begin to work through some of the practical legislative choices that 
would need to be made in a state that permitted it.  It is hoped that this 
will advance the project of marriage freedom by demonstrating that, al-
though it would require some conceptual innovations in the law, plural 
marriage can be accommodated without doing violence to any of the ba-
sic principles of the marital property system. 
This Article focuses on plural marriage in community property 
states for two primary reasons.  First, community property jurisdictions 
are likely to contain a diversity of potential participants in a more inclu-
sive institution of marriage.  Two of the largest polygamous Fundamen-
talist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS) communities 
are in community property states, Colorado City, Arizona,24 and the YFZ 
Ranch outside Eldorado, Texas, raided in April 2008.25  Centennial Park, 
Arizona, is home to a breakaway group from the FLDS,26 as is Boundary 
County, in northern Idaho (near Bountiful, in Creston Valley, Canada).27  
One large polygamous family, the “Kingston clan,” has very substantial 
business interests in Nevada, California, and Idaho, and thus would be 
acquiring community or quasi-community property in those states.28  At 
the same time, cities like Seattle, Washington, Los Angeles and San 
Francisco, California, Las Vegas, Nevada, and New Orleans, Louisiana, 
 
Polygamy as a Red Herring in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 54 DUKE L.J. 1665, 1692 (2005) (“In 
light of the high value modern U.S. culture places on individual autonomy and equality, the corner-
stones of the companionate ideal of marriage, it is unlikely that polygamy could be legalized under 
the same individuality-focused rationale of Lawrence or Goodridge because polygamy tends to be 
premised on dependence, inequality, and even subordination.”); Laura Elizabeth Brown, Comment, 
Regulating the Marrying Kind: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Polygamy Under the 
Mann Act, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 267 (2008) (arguing that polygamy may constitutionally be regu-
lated under the Commerce Clause). 
 24 JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN 10 (Anchor Books 2004). 
 25 137 Children Removed from Polygamous Ranch, CNN JUSTICE, Apr. 4, 2008, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-04-04/justice/texas.ranch_1_polygamist-sect-yfz-ranch-marleigh-
meisner?_s=PM:CRIME. 
 26 Kirk Johnson & John Dougherty, Raid on Sect in Texas Rattles Other Polygamists, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 8, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/08/us/08raid.html. 
 27 JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN 31-42 (Anchor Books 2004); Nicholas 
K. Geranios, Idaho Officials Studying Polygamists in Bonners Ferry, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 
Apr. 19, 2005, available at http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/20050418-1450-wst-
idahopolygamists.html; Susan Drumheller, Women of Bountiful Plan Summit: B.C. Polygamist Col-
ony Facing Increasing  Scrutiny, SPOKESMAN REVIEW, Apr. 17, 2005, available at 
http://www.spokesmanreview.com/tools/story_pf.asp?ID=64978. 
 28 JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN 18 (Anchor Books 2004); Brooke Ad-
ams, Kingston Inc.: Polygamy's Entrepreneurial Empire, A Company, a Clan, a Corp. with a Plan, 
SALT LAKE OBSERVER, Aug. 14, 1998, available at 
http://www.xmission.com/~plporter/lds/kingston.htm. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss1/5
2010]    PLURAL MARRIAGE & COMMUNITY PROPERTY 39 
have long been home to sexual and relationship non-conformists of one 
kind or another.29  There are self-identified “poly-” groups in all of the 
community property states.30 
The second reason for focusing on community property states is that 
plural marriage, perhaps surprisingly, is not so easy to integrate into the 
community property theory of marital property ownership.  As it turns 
out, it is not at all obvious how best to understand, classify, and divide 
the community property of a person with more than one spouse at a time, 
as must be done at death or divorce.  This Article focuses on proposed 
revisions to the California Family Code (and Penal and Probate Codes, as 
appropriate), for several reasons.  California is a bellwether state for 
marital and family law in general, and for community property law in 
 
 29 Washington (Seattle Polyamory Meetup Group, MEETUP.COM, 
http://polyamory.meetup.com/1/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010)); California (many, including Santa Cruz 
Polyamory Meetup Group, MEETUP.COM, http://polyamory.meetup.com/3/ (last visited Oct. 9, 
2010); Nevada (PolyVegas, YAHOO GROUPS, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/adultconf?dest=%2Fgroup%2FPolyVegas%2F (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) 
(age-restricted site)); Louisiana (YAHOO GROUPS, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/adultconf?dest=%2Fgroup%2FPolyLouisiana%2F (last visited Oct. 9, 
2010) (age-restricted site); Polyamoury in Louisiana, YAHOO GROUPS, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/polyamouryinlouisiana/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010)). 
 30 Arizona (The Cave Creek Polyamory Meetup, MEETUP.COM, 
http://polyamory.meetup.com/409/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010); LIBERATED CHRISTIANS, 
http://www.libchrist.com/poly/contents.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2010); California (many, including 
Santa Cruz Polyamory Meetup Group, MEETUP.COM, http://polyamory.meetup.com/3/ (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2010); Los Angeles Polyamory Meetup Group, MEETUP.COM, 
http://polyamory.meetup.com/393/ (Oct. 9, 2010); Idaho (Inland North-West Poly, YAHOO GROUPS, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/adultconf?dest=%2Fgroup%2Finwpoly%2F (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (age-
restricted site)); Louisiana (YAHOO GROUPS, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/adultconf?dest=%2Fgroup%2FPolyLouisiana%2F (last visited Oct. 9, 
2010) (age-restricted site); Polyamoury in Louisiana, YAHOO GROUPS, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/polyamouryinlouisiana/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010)); Nevada (PolyVe-
gas, YAHOO GROUPS, http://groups.yahoo.com/adultconf?dest=%2Fgroup%2FPolyVegas%2F (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2010) (age-restricted site)); New Mexico (Ethi-Q Slutdom, MEETUP.COM, 
http://eventful.com/albuquerque/events/the-ethical-slut-discussion-group-part-23-/E0-001-
006662727-3 (last visited Oct. 9, 2010)); Texas (Austin Polyamory Social Group, YAHOO GROUPS, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/adultconf?dest=%2Fgroup%2Fpoly-austin%2F (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) 
(age-restricted site); Poly-Houston, POLYAMORY.ORG, http://lists.polyamory.org/listinfo.cgi/poly-
houston-polyamory.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2010); DFW-Poly, YAHOO GROUPS, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/adultconf?dest=%2Fgroup%2FDFW-Poly%2F (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) 
(age-restricted site)); Washington (Seattle Polyamory Meetup Group, MEETUP.COM, 
http://polyamory.meetup.com/1/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010)); and Wisconsin (Madison Area Polya-
mory Society, YAHOO GROUPS, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MAPSMembers/ (last visited Oct. 9, 
2010); Poly Eau Claire, Wisconsin, YAHOO GROUPS,  http://groups.yahoo.com/ 
group/PolyEauClaire/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010); Polyamory in Wisconsin, YAHOO GROUPS, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/adultconf?dest=%2Fgroup%2FPolyamory_In_Wisconsin%2F (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2010) (age-restricted site); PolyMilwaukee, YAHOO GROUPS, 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/PolyMilwaukee/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010)). 
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particular.  It is the most populous state in the United States.31  Finally, in 
this author’s opinion, it has the best-developed jurisprudence of commu-
nity property law.  The basic approach taken here can also be used in 
other states. 
I. PRELIMINARY LEGAL REFORMS REQUIRED FOR PLURAL MARRIAGE 
 RIGHTS 
Several immediate changes in the law would be required in order to 
secure and protect plural marriage rights, predominantly in state laws de-
fining marriage, specifying legal barriers to valid marriage, and anti-
bigamy criminal statutes.32  These changes go deeper into the law than 
the changes required to accommodate same-sex marriage, which requires 
primarily semantic changes such as changing gender-specific terms like 
“husband” or “wife” to gender-neutral terms like “spouse,” even when 
the gender of one or both spouses is specified. 
Changing the legal definition of marriage is comparatively straight-
forward.  California Family Code Section 300, for example, defines mar-
riage as “a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man 
and a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of making that 
contract is necessary.”33  Should same-sex marriage rights be restored in 
California, the italicized words could simply be deleted.34  Alternatively, 
 
 31 U.S. Census, Resident Population of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico: Census 2000, available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/maps/respop.html. 
 32 It should be noted that establishing marriage freedom of this breadth would also require 
changing or overruling the state constitutions of Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah, 
which to this day contain provisions stating that polygamy is “forever prohibited.”  See ARIZ. 
CONST. art. XX, par. 2; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 
2; UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). However, even those states whose constitutions prohibit polygamy have the power to change 
this.  See, e.g., Barlow v. Blackburn, 798 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the anti-
polygamy clause in the state constitution was not void under equal footing doctrine, U.S. CONST. art. 
4, § 3, cl. 1, on the theory that it was included solely to satisfy the requirements of the Enabling Act 
so that Arizona could gain statehood; whatever the limitations imposed by the Enabling Act, Arizona 
has had full power since statehood to repeal the antipolygamy clause).  Full-scale legalization would 
also require repeal of § 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which states, “In determining the 
meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various admin-
istrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a per-
son of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West-
law 2010). Certain other federal laws would also need to be changed, such as the law authorizing the 
exclusion of immigrants “coming to the United States to practice polygamy.” See 8 U.S.C.A. § 
1182(a)(10)(A) (Westlaw 2010); 22 C.F.R. § 40.101 (Westlaw 2010). 
 33 CAL. FAM. CODE § 300(a) (Westlaw 2010) (emphasis added). 
 34 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
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the definition could be combined with section 297, defining domestic 
partners as “two adults who have chosen to share one another’s lives in 
an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring.”35  Merging 
them would yield a working definition of marriage: “a personal relation 
arising out of a civil contract between adults who have chosen to share 
one another’s lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual 
caring, to which the consent of the parties capable of making that con-
tract is necessary.” 
Civil laws relating to impediments to marriage would have to be 
amended or repealed.  California Family Code Section 2201(a), a typical 
anti-bigamy statute,36 provides that “[a] subsequent marriage contracted 
by a person during the life of a former husband or wife of the person, 
with a person other than the former husband or wife, is illegal and void 
from the beginning,” unless the former marriage has been annulled or 
dissolved or the former spouse is legally presumed dead.37  This law 
might be amended to add an additional exception providing that a subse-
quent marriage is valid if “the former spouse has been notified of and 
consented to the subsequent marriage.”38 
 
 35 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 36 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-11-8-2 (Westlaw 2010) (“A marriage is void if either party to the 
marriage had a wife or husband who was living when the marriage was solemnized.”); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 595.19(2) (Westlaw 2010) (“Marriages between persons either of whom has a husband or 
wife living are void”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020(1)(b) (Westlaw 2010) (“Marriage is prohib-
ited and void: . . . Where there is a husband or wife living, from whom the person marrying has not 
been divorced”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (Westlaw 2010) (“A marriage contracted 
while either party has a living wife or husband from whom the party is not divorced is void.”); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 207, § 4 (Westlaw 2010) (“A marriage contracted while either party 
thereto has a former wife or husband living [and not divorced] . . . shall be void.”); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 451.030 (Westlaw 2010) (“All marriages, where either of the parties has a former wife or husband 
living, shall be void, unless the former marriage shall have been dissolved.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 125.290 (Westlaw 2010) (“All marriages which are prohibited by law because of: . . . [e]ither of 
the parties having a former husband or wife then living, if solemnized within this State, are void 
without any decree of divorce or annulment or other legal proceedings.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 6 
(Westlaw 2010) (“A marriage is absolutely void if contracted by a person whose husband or wife by 
a former marriage is living,” unless such former marriage has been annulled or dissolved); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-1-80 (Westlaw 2010) (“All marriages contracted while either of the parties has a 
former wife or husband living shall be void.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (Westlaw 2010) (“The 
following marriages are prohibited and declared void: (1) when there is a husband or wife living, 
from whom the person marrying has not been divorced”); Tagupa v. Tagupa, 121 P.3d 924, 926 
(Haw. Ct. App.2005) (“In Hawaii, living person A’s purported marriage to living person C, while 
living person A is lawfully married to living person B, is void ab initio.”) (citing Kienitz v. Sager, 40 
Haw. 1, 2-3 (1953)).  Less common is a statute like Kentucky Revised Statute Section 402.020(1)(e), 
prohibiting marriage “[b]etween more than two (2) persons” as such. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§402.020(1)(e) (Westlaw 2010). 
 37 CAL. FAM. CODE § 2201(a) (Westlaw 2010).  California’s use of the term “former spouse” 
includes a current spouse, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 11. 
 38 In this Article, proposed changes to existing statutes are noted in italics. 
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Statutes criminalizing bigamy would also need to be repealed.39  In 
California, this includes Penal Code Section 281(a) (“Every person hav-
ing a husband or wife living, who marries any other person . . . is guilty 
of bigamy.”),40 Penal Code Section 283 (“Bigamy is punishable by a fine 
not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or by imprisonment in a 
county jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison.”),41 and Penal 
Code Section 284 (“Every person who knowingly and willfully marries 
the husband or wife of another, in any case in which such husband or 
wife would be punishable under the provisions of this chapter, is punish-
able by fine not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprison-
ment in the state prison.”).42 
With these legal reforms accomplished, a person still married to one 
person could legally marry another.  Although it might be socially revo-
lutionary, permitting plural marriage is comparatively easy from a legal 
point of view.  The complications introduced by plural marriage occur 
when we begin to think about the following: whether the person with 
more than one spouse who marries again has created one large “commu-
nity,” or multiple dyadic communities, for community property purposes; 
whether everyone in a plural marriage should be thought of as being mar-
ried to every other person in the marriage, from a community property 
point of view; and how property should be distributed when one or more 
of the unions ends in death or divorce.43 
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Several assumptions or basic principles will guide the discussion 
that follows.  It will be demonstrated why these assumptions are justi-
fied, although not necessarily shared by each and every advocate of plu-
ral marriage, at least in the context of a legal exploration of the contours 
of marriage freedom. 
 
 39 See Appendix: Laws Against Bigamy. 
 40 CAL. PENAL CODE § 281(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 41 CAL. PENAL CODE § 283 (Westlaw 2010). 
 42 CAL. PENAL CODE § 284 (Westlaw 2010). 
 43 Hence, this author must differ with commentators such as Samantha Slark, who implied 
that all that is required is for “[l]egislatures [to] simply repeal statutes criminalizing polygamy and 
bigamy. . . .  Alternatively, the legislature could both repeal statutes criminalizing polygamy and 
bigamy and amend statutes governing the issuance of a marriage license to allow marriage licenses 
to be issued for polygamous marriages.” Samantha Slark, Note, Are Anti-Polygamy Laws an Uncon-
stitutional Infringement on the Liberty Interests of Consenting Adults?, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451, 
460 (2004).  Either way would be only the beginning.  The rules surrounding management of com-
munity property and creditors’ rights over community property during marriage are also quite com-
plicated, but beyond the scope of this Article. 
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First, a theory of marriage law based on autonomy in intimate asso-
ciation must be neutral as to gender and sexual preference.44  The value 
and possession of autonomy is not and ought not be dependent on the 
gender to which one is assigned at birth, nor any later choice of social 
gender in conformity with or rejection of the assigned one.  Nor is auton-
omy more valuable in, or more valued by, those of one or another of the 
more or less familiar sexual preferences or orientations (e.g., heterosex-
ual, homosexual, bisexual).  Whether any proposed union is with a per-
son of the same or a different gender (now or as assigned at birth) or ori-
entation than oneself will be regarded as irrelevant to the selection or 
defense of any proposed rule. 
This presents one of the central paradoxes of a liberty-oriented de-
fense of plural marriage.  Many of the arguments made herein would be 
uncongenial, to say the very least, to many proponents and participants in 
plural marriage.  It is a common belief that religious and traditional prac-
titioners of “polygamy”45 often adhere to very strong norms relating to 
the gender binary,46 articulate and enforce radically disparate gender 
roles (often on gender essentialist grounds), and are aggressively sexist 
and heterosexist.47  A liberty-and-autonomy-oriented defender of plural 
 
 44 This is not the only possible argument in favor of plural marriage, though, as Levinson 
remarks, “The easiest defense of polygamy, of course, would be based on individual autonomy.  If 
consenting adults wish to live in such a relationship, why ought not the state allow it?”  Sanford Lev-
inson, Thinking About Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1049, 1055 (2005).  Levinson sketches 
other more “utilitarian” arguments: “if one assesses marriage . . . as an institution focused, in the 
early stages on rearing children, and then later on taking care of ailing partners, then polygamy be-
gins to look better and better. . . . If legally recognized polygamy were available, one might easily 
foresee a relatively large number of ‘communal marriages’ entered into by middle-aged or old-aged 
persons.” Id. at 1056, 1058. 
 45 Used in this particular context, although not throughout this Article, to mean one man with 
many wives. 
 46 The phrase “gender binary” is used here to mean the idea that human beings come in ex-
actly two genders, corresponding rigidly to exactly two preexisting biological sexes.  See generally 
Sara R. Benson, Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: Recognizing Fundamental Rights for the Inter-
sexed, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GEND. 31 (2005). 
 47 See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage – The Theoretical Perspective, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 102 n.46 (2003) (“By my comments, I do not mean to imply that there have 
not been past and present unpleasant associations with polygamous practices, including sexist as-
sumptions or the exploitation of under-age women.”); see generally Michael Janofsky, Young Brides 
Stir New Outcry on Utah Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at A1; Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, 
Family Separation Is a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 213, 244 (2003) 
(“When practiced by particular groups within Western countries – most notably by the Mormons in 
the United States during the nineteenth century, and to a much smaller extent today – mainstream 
society has condemned polygamy as immoral, sexist, and destructive to children, and has pressured 
these groups to change their practices.”); Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory 
and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exer-
cise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 696 (2001) (“The vast majority of those known as polyga-
mists – both of Mormon and non-Mormon origin – actually practice polygyny, one man with multi-
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marriage need share none of these views; this author personally rejects 
all of them. 
This author’s own commitments to gender and sexual-preference 
neutrality, as well as neutrality between religious and non-religious 
worldviews and understandings of the marriage relation, mean that this 
analysis will proceed from the assumption that any acceptable legal 
change that would validate a man having multiple wives would also vali-
date a woman having multiple spouses; however, this does not necessar-
ily result in polyandry, because she may be married to women as well.  
All-male and all-female marriages, marriages between or including per-
sons who do not identify as either traditional gender, as well as egalitar-
ian group marriages, including same-sex unions may also exist.  A forti-
ori, if three men or three women can all be married to one another, of 
course two men or two women can be, same-sex unions being a “lesser 
included case” in plural marriage.  Same-sex marriage is therefore sub-
sumed in the liberty and autonomy-based defense of plural marriage.48 
The examples that follow employ a (comparatively) simple three- or 
four-person “cast of characters,” unimaginatively named A, B, C, and D.  
Four individuals are sufficient to raise most of the theoretical problems.  
Scalability issues for group marriages of even more persons will also 
(briefly) be discussed where appropriate.  Letters, rather than gender-
identified names, have been selected deliberately; for the same reason, 
gendered pronouns and status-identifying terms (like “husband” and 
“wife,” “widow and “widower”) have been avoided as much as possible. 
III. MODELS OF PLURAL MARRIAGE 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the ménage à trois is the most 
 
ple wives, while polyandry, one wife with multiple husbands, is rare and often condemned.  Even 
discounting for a degree of anti-Mormon hysteria – tales of incest, underage girls forced into polyg-
amy with older men, slave-like situations for unwilling plural wives – the typical polygamist family 
still seems like a male sexist's dream world.”). 
 48 A related argument, taken up by commentators, is to what extent arguments in favor of 
same-sex marriage must necessarily apply to plural marriage as well.  As Sanford Levinson remarks, 
“If I were advising gay- and lesbian-rights groups, I would heartily counsel them to distance them-
selves from the socially marginal groups that today advocate polygamy.  There would be little to 
gain, and possibly much to lose, by embracing the strange practices of decidedly off-putting people 
from Utah and Arizona as part of the argument on behalf of better treatment for gays and lesbians.  
But this is, obviously, entirely a political point.” Sanford Levinson, Thinking About Polygamy, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1049, 1049, 1054-55 (2005).  Note that even as sophisticated a commentator as 
Levinson carelessly fails to distinguish between “advocating polygamy” and advocating marriage 
rights for polygamists (a difference as significant as that between “advocating abortion” and “advo-
cating abortion rights”). 
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common plural arrangement, in life and in fiction.49  But even with a 
group as small as three persons, there are at least two models upon which 
a plural marriage might be built; a fourth person adds two more possibili-
ties.  Each of these is a form of plural marriage, but each reflects a 
somewhat different understanding of what plural marriage is or could be, 
and each requires different treatment under community property princi-
ples. 
A. ASYMMETRIC POLYGAMY 
Consider a married couple, A and B.  Some time after marrying A, 
B desires to marry C.  Under current law, B can do so only after divorc-
ing A.50  If B does not divorce A before marrying C, B and C would be 
engaged in the criminal practice of bigamy.51  On the other hand, if plural 
marriage were legal, B could marry C without divorcing A.  (See Figure 
1.) 
After the second marriage, B would have two spouses (bigamy, or 
simple polygamy) – but A and C would each have only one, B.  This is 
sometimes called a “V” arrangement, with B as the “hinge” spouse.52  
The death of B would leave two surviving spouses, A and C.  However, 
the death of A would leave only one – B; B would, of course, still be 
married to C.  Similarly, the divorce of A and B would have no effect on 





 49 See, e.g., POLYAMORYONLINE.ORG, 
http://www.polyamoryonline.org/articles/polyanna_120605.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2010); 
ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 134 (1966) (“He was married in common-
est [sic] type, a troika in which he was senior husband”; on Luna, where men outnumber women 2 to 
1, the most common marriage form is one woman with two husbands); SAMUEL R. DELANY, BABEL 
17 (1966) (describing “triples”); JOE HALDEMAN, WORLDS (1981) (describing “triunes”); NOEL 
COWARD, DESIGN FOR LIVING (1933) (play); MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, A HOME AT THE END OF THE 
WORLD (1998); GILBERT ADAIR, HOLY INNOCENTS (1989); and the films Jules and Jim (1962), 
Paint Your Wagon (1969), Cabaret (1972), Y tu mamá también (2001), and Bandits (2001). 
 50 See Appendix: Laws Against Bigamy. 
 51 See Appendix: Laws Against Bigamy. 
 52 POLYAMORYSOCIETY.ORG, http://www.polyamorysociety.org/language.html (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2010). 
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This asymmetric model, when instantiated by one husband with 
multiple wives, is what is most commonly meant by those using the term 
“polygamy.”53  It is the model adopted by those for whom these marriage 
practices have a strong customary foundation, even a religious mandate, 
including FLDS and independent Mormon polygamists,54 some Mus-
 
 53 And indeed, some commentators object only to this form, arguing that “the state, exercis-
ing legitimate paternalistic powers, ought to be able to ban marriages that are structurally problem-
atic in this way [asymmetrical polygamy or polyandry]. . . . [But] marriages that take the form of 
ménages-a-trois, or ménages-a-quatre, and so on – marriages in which (in some sense) each of the 
spouses is ‘married’ to each of the other spouses” do not have this problem.  Samuel C. Rickless, 
Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage: A Response to Calhoun, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1048 
(2005). 
 54 In fact, what FLDS Mormons practice is more properly described as androcentric hetero-
sexual asymmetric polygyny.  The Principles that describe it are gender-specific – “celestial mar-
riage” involves a man taking multiple wives; a woman’s sexual involvement with multiple men is 
still considered “adultery” and is a capital offense. Doctrine & Covenants 132:61, available at 
http://scriptures.lds.org/dc/132/46,47,48,49 (“And again, as pertaining to the law of the priesthood – 
if any man espouse a virgin, and desire to espouse another, and the first give her consent, and if he 
espouse the second, and they are virgins, and have vowed to no other man, then is he justified; he 
cannot commit adultery for they are given unto him; for he cannot commit adultery with that that 
belongeth unto him and to no one else. And if he have ten virgins given unto him by this law, he 
cannot commit adultery, for they belong to him, and they are given unto him; therefore is he justi-
fied. But if one or either of the ten virgins, after she is espoused, shall be with another man, she has 
committed adultery, and shall be destroyed; for they are given unto him to multiply and replenish the 
earth, according to my commandment, and to fulfil the promise which was given by my Father be-
fore the foundation of the world, and for their exaltation in the eternal worlds, that they may bear the 
souls of men; for herein is the work of my Father continued, that he may be glorified.”).  See also 
Gordon B. Hinckley, What Are People Asking About Us?, ENSIGN, Nov. 1998, at 70, available at 
http://lds.org/ldsorg/v/index.jsp?locale=0&sourceId=9c672f2324d98010VgnVCM1000004d82620a
____&vgnextoid=bbd508f54922d010VgnVCM1000004d82620aRCRD (“People inquire about our 
position on those who consider themselves so-called gays and lesbians. My response is that we love 
them as sons and daughters of God. They may have certain inclinations which are powerful and 
which may be difficult to control. Most people have inclinations of one kind or another at various 
times. If they do not act upon these inclinations, then they can go forward as do all other members of 
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lims,55 and some Africans.56  For these reasons, polygamy itself is often 
regarded as heavily gendered, patriarchal, sexist,57 traditional, or even 
reactionary, misogynistic, or archaic in its gender politics.58  Fertility and 
family-building are often central to the understanding of the marriage re-
lationship and may take precedence over companionate dimensions of 
coupling.59  At the same time, the relationships between and among the 
wives can be quite intimate, although not sexually; they often live in 
close quarters and participate in one another’s daily lives, including the 
bringing up of one another’s children, much more closely than do most 
siblings or friends outside that environment.60 
Typical, real-life practices notwithstanding, nothing about this “hub 
and spoke” (perhaps we should call it “hubby and spoke”) model re-
 
the Church. If they violate the law of chastity and the moral standards of the Church, then they are 
subject to the discipline of the Church, just as others are.”) 
 55 See Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia to Black 
America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-first Century, 11 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 854-57 (2001) (British Muslims). 
 56 See id. at 844-54; see also Theodore C. Bergstrom, On the Economics of Polygyny (1994) 
available at http://www.bec.ucla.edu/polygyny3.pdf (“The institutions that we model appear to be 
particularly close to those found in the polygynous societies of Africa where polygyny is the norm. 
In the countries of the Sahel region of Africa, the percentage of women living in polygynous house-
holds ranges from 45% to 55%. In West Africa, Central Africa, and East Africa, these percentages 
are mostly in the range from 25% to 35%.”). 
 57 Often this is assumed without argument; e.g., “In the U.S. Constitution, Blacks were 
counted as three-fifths of a person for representation purposes.  Today, some lonely women remain 
ready to have a much smaller piece than three-fifths of a man.”  Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamy 
from Southern Africa to Black Britannia to Black America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal 
Reform for the Twenty-first Century, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 811, 858 (2001) (British Mus-
lims).  John Hartung, Polygyny and Inheritance of Wealth, 23 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 1 (1982), 
presents a very interesting argument to the conclusion that “humans tend to transmit wealth to male 
descendants where polygyny is possible,” a different form of sexism than is usually identified as 
problematic in polygamy. 
 58 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 
(1890), overruled on other grounds by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also John Arbuth-
nott, An Argument for Divine Providence, Taken from the Constant Regularity Observ’d in the 
Births of Both Sexes, 27 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS [of the Royal Society, London] 186, 189 
(1710) available at http://rstl.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/27/325-336/186.full.pdf (“Polyg-
amy is contrary to the Law of Nature and Justice, and to the Propagation of the Human Race; for 
where Males and Females are in equal number, if one Man takes Twenty Wives, Nineteen Men must 
live in Celibacy, which is repugnant to the Design of Nature; nor is it probable that Twenty Women 
will be so well impregnated by one Man as by Twenty.”). 
 59 Ruth K. Khalsa, Note, Polygamy as a Red Herring in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 54 
DUKE L.J. 1665, 1693 (2005), contrasts the “procreative-economic purpose” of marriage in which 
“polygamy is rooted” with “companionate” models that support opposite-sex and same-sex mo-
nogamous marriages. Id. at 1693.  Khalsa appears never to have heard of group marriage, or to have 
considered whether plural marriage might do as well (or at least, no worse!) at furthering compan-
ionship and individual fulfillment, as monogamous marriage. 
 60 See Irwin Altman, Husbands and Wives in Contemporary Polygamy, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 
389 (2006). 
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quires that the central person be a man, and all radial persons be women, 
persons of a different gender than the hub, or the same gender as one an-
other.  The distinctive feature of this model, from a community property 
point of view, is not that it has a man at the center and women arrayed 
around him.  It is that most participants have one spouse, but one partici-
pant has more.  In a group of n persons, the radial spouses have exactly 
one spouse, while the hub has n-1.  This is what this Article will refer to 
as “asymmetric polygamy.”61  This term is meant to be descriptive, not 
pejorative, and there is no necessary implication that the person with 
more spouses is more favored, privileged, or powerful than the person(s) 
with fewer. 
B. GROUP MARRIAGE 
Under the group-marriage model, B may marry C without divorcing 
A, and A and C may also marry one another.  Each person in the mar-
riage group is married to everyone else – in this case, both of the other 
two.  In this form of plural marriage, the death of one spouse always 
leaves multiple surviving spouses.  In addition, while any pair might di-
vorce, only a divorce of or by both of the others would completely ex-
tract the third, severing the legal relationships between them and leaving 
behind a married couple and one former spouse of the other two.  (See 
Figure 2, below.) 
 
 61 It is thus a mistake first to define polygamy this way, and then draw conclusions that pur-
port to apply more broadly.  See, e.g., Cassiah M. Ward, Note, I Now Pronounce You Husband and 
Wives: Lawrence v. Texas and the Practice of Polygamy in Modern America, 11 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 131 (2004), viewing with skepticism “polygamous situations where all parties in-
volved claim to be consenting adults,” and expressly using “polygamy” to refer exclusively to 
FLDS-style polygyny: “For the purposes of this note, unless otherwise noted, the term ‘polygamist’ 
is used in reference to Fundamentalist Mormons practicing polygamy in the United States, primarily 
in the Southwest.  For the purposes of this note, the terms ‘plural marriage,’ ‘celestial marriage,’ and 
‘spiritual wifery’ will all be considered synonymous to polygamy.”  Id. at 131 n.12. Ward then con-
cludes that there is “a compelling state interest to prevent polygamous marriage, one that substan-
tially trumps any claim to a privacy right that a polygamist might assert.”  Id. at 150-51.  If, as Ward 
argues, such marriages result from pressure “tantamount to coercion,” even a regime that permitted 
plural marriage could criminalize such conduct, just as it does with monogamous marriage today.  
Id. at 151.  Coercion is not permissible, even for a first marriage; therefore, her argument misses the 
point. It also proves too little, since it is unable to reach, for example, coercive first marriage in po-
lygamous communities.  See ELISSA WALL, STOLEN INNOCENCE (2008). 
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This more egalitarian model necessarily includes same-sex mar-
riage, because at least one of the unions described will involve two per-
sons born or socially identified as the same gender, and, in fact, all three 
participants might be of the same biological and social gender.  Each 
person in the relationship has the same number of spouses (n-1) and is 
married to each of the other persons in the relationship.  The term “group 
marriage” will be used for this type of arrangement. 
C. “LINE” MARRIAGE, “DAISY-CHAINS,” HYBRIDS, AND SCALABILITY 
Asymmetric polygamy and group marriage would both be legal if 
bigamy were decriminalized, and they would probably cover a signifi-
cant fraction of the actual arrangements people might desire.62  But they 
do not exhaust the possibilities.  Although these two arrangements are 
“scalable” for groups of four or more persons, there are also distinctive 
forms for larger groups. 
 
 62 See Appendix: Laws Against Bigamy; see also POLYAMORYONLINE.ORG, 
http://www.polyamoryonline.org/articles/polyanna_120605.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2010); 
ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 134 (1966) (“He was married in common-
est [sic] type, a troika in which he was senior husband”; on Luna, where men outnumber women 2 to 
1, the most common marriage form is one woman with two husbands); SAMUEL R. DELANY, BABEL 
17 (1966) (describing “triples”); JOE HALDEMAN, WORLDS (1981) (describing “triunes”); NOEL 
COWARD, DESIGN FOR LIVING (1933) (play); MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, A HOME AT THE END OF THE 
WORLD (1998); GILBERT ADAIR, HOLY INNOCENTS (1989). 
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In four-person asymmetric polygamy, the “hub” simply acquires 
another spouse. (Figure 3, above.)  In a four-person group marriage, all 





The first model unique to the four-person case is the “line” mar-
riage.  In a line marriage, A is married to B, who is also married to C, 
who is also married to D.63  (Figure 5, below.)  A three-person line mar-
 
 63 The terminology is drawn from Heinlein, although his “line” marriages more closely re-
semble group marriages, in which everyone is married to everyone, but in which all sex is hetero-
sexual.  ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 42-43 (1966) (“Our marriage is 
nearly a hundred years old. . . . twenty-one links, nine alive today, never a divorce. . . . Spacing has 
no rule, just what suits us.  Been alternation [by gender] up to latest link, last year.  We married a 
girl when alternation called for boy. . . . senior husband . . . spent our wedding night with her – but 
consummation was only formal.  Number-two husband . . . took care of it later”). 
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riage is de facto identical to asymmetric polygamy with a hub and two 
radial spouses; the difference between them does not emerge until a 






A variant on this is the “daisy chain” marriage. (Figure 6, below.)  
A “daisy chain” arrangement might be adopted by four heterosexuals, 
two men (A and C) and two women (B and D).  Each person is married 
to the two opposite-sex members of the group.  Again, note that a three-
person daisy-chain is the same as the three-person group marriage; it 





Hybrid forms are also possible in which, for example, A, B, and C 
are all married to one another, but C is also married to D, and no one else 
is. (Figure 7, below.) 
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Thus, C has three spouses (A, B, and D), A and B each have two, 
and D has one (C). 
In another variant, A is married to B, C, and D; D is married to A 
and E; B and C are married only to A, and E is married only to D.  (Fig-




Still larger groups present a myriad of possibilities (a hub-and-
spoke marriage in which some, but not all, spokes are also married to one 
20
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another; a person who is a spoke in one relationship and a hub with re-
spect to other individuals; etc.).  For the sake of simplicity in what fol-
lows, however, this Article will focus on the two models that cover the 
three-person case, asymmetric polygamy and group marriage, and the 
two that arise for the four-person case, the line and daisy-chain models.  
The crucial questions and results can be generated for those cases and 
then applied to larger and more complex groups. 
IV. NOTICE AND CONSENT 
Even in their current, monogamous formulations, marriage laws 
recognize the importance of consent (autonomy) and choice (liberty) in 
entering into the marriage relationship.64  Legal plural marriage need not 
derogate from that.  In keeping with the autonomy-enhancing approach 
to marriage law, the validity of a plural marriage must depend, at a 
minimum, upon notice being provided to any and all existing spouses. 
Consent is somewhat more complicated.  The marriage relationship 
is, ideally, one between adults and equals.  It is unlike the relationship 
between parent and child, in which parents need not obtain a child’s con-
sent before adding another child, or a different spouse, to the family.  
The decision to add a spouse implicates an individual’s freedom of inti-
mate association, which makes a requirement of a third party’s consent, 
even if that third party is already one’s spouse, more problematic.  In 
group marriages, the need for all-around consent is obvious.  If both A 
and B are to marry C, all three must necessarily consent to the entirety of 
the arrangement.  Without belaboring the analogy, this is approximately 
a partnership model in which, as is well established, “[n]o person can be-
come a member of a partnership without the consent of all the part-
ners.”65  What justifies this is that all partners will have duties and re-
sponsibilities to one another, and each partner’s interests in the 
 
 64 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 301 (Westlaw 2010) (“An unmarried male of the age of 18 
years or older, and an unmarried female of the age of 18 years or older, and not otherwise disquali-
fied, are capable of consenting to . . . marriage.”) (emphasis added); CAL. FAM. CODE § 302(a) 
(Westlaw 2010) (“An unmarried male or female under the age of 18 years is capable of consenting 
to and consummating marriage upon obtaining a court order granting permission to the underage 
person or persons to marry.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 305 (Westlaw 2010) (“Consent to and solemniza-
tion of marriage may be proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts are proved in other 
cases.”). 
 65 See, e.g., Tucker v. Ellbogen, 793 P.2d 592, 598 (Colo. App. 1989); In re Estate of Smith, 
749 P.2d 512, 515 (Mont. 1988); Buffkin v. Strickland, 312 S.E.2d 579 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); see 
also REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(i) (1997) (“A person may become a partner only with the 
consent of all of the partners.”); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401 cmt. 10 (1997) (“Subsection (i) 
continues the substance of UPA Section 18(g) that no person can become a partner without the con-
sent of all the partners.”). 
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partnership are affected by the addition of new partners. 
However, if only B (not A) marries C, as in asymmetric polygamy 
or line marriage, and only B (not A) acquires legal marital duties towards 
C, the need for A’s consent is not self-evident.  Requiring A’s consent as 
a prerequisite for B’s formation of a subsequent valid marital union with 
C reduces B’s sexual and intimate associational freedom and thus must 
be justified.  By way of comparison, current divorce law has no consent 
requirement66 – B does not need A’s consent to divorce A.67  Being 
“trapped” in a marriage is regarded as a very serious deprivation of B’s 
intimate associational liberty;68 in the case of a conflict, B’s desire to end 
the marriage trumps A’s desire to stay married.  Should plural marriage 
be like this, so that B’s desire to marry C always trumps A’s desire that B 
not do so?  The answer is not obvious. 
A consent requirement for plural marriage gives existing spouses 
like A the power to “hold up” the subsequent marriage by withholding 
consent, or to obtain other concessions, and introduces a “barrier to en-
try” although B has no “barrier to exit.”  Moreover, a consent require-
ment is not the existing spouse’s sole source of power.  If B marries C, A 
may divorce B and reject the arrangement, or remain married to B and 
ratify the new marriage.  The risk of A divorcing B if B marries C with-
out A’s consent may induce B to obtain that consent even if it is not 
strictly required, depending on the power balance in their relationship 
and on B’s desire to stay married to A as compared to the desire to marry 
C.  Without a consent requirement, A would have no power to prevent or 
void the subsequent marriage. 
The analogy from business partnership law may help resolve this 
impasse.  Consent is necessary in that context69 because adding partners 
changes the rights and duties of existing partners.70  Even though A does 
not owe any marital obligations to C, insofar as A’s marital rights are ad-
versely affected by B’s additional spouse, A’s consent would be re-
 
 66 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2338 (Westlaw 2010) (no mention of consent in determination of 
order). 
 67 Interestingly, in Heinlein’s fictional world, divorce from a plural marriage requires the 
consent of all persons married to that spouse.  ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH 
MISTRESS 260 (1996) (“[It] takes unanimous decision of all wives to divorce a husband.”). 
 68 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (“Choices about marriage, family life, and the 
upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance 
in our society,’ rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usur-
pation, disregard, or disrespect.”) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)). 
 69 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(g) (1914) (“No person can become a member of a partnership 
without the consent of all of the partners.”). 
 70 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(e) (1914) (“All partners have equal rights in the management and 
conduct of the partnership business.”). 
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quired.  Consent by existing spouses turns out to be necessary in order to 
reconcile plural marriage with existing community property law.  Fur-
ther, an all-around consent requirement for any plural marriage may help 
to allay some ethical concerns about inherent inequality in these marriage 
forms, particularly those in which not all spouses enter into multiple 
marital unions.71 
V. PLURAL MARRIAGE IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES 
A. THE THEORY OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
The community property theory of marriage and marital property 
can be thought of as positing that, upon marriage, a new entity comes 
into being, the “community,” distinct from either of the spouses.72  For 
the duration of the marriage, the community owns the labor of each 
spouse and all of the proceeds therefrom.73  All of the property owned by 
unmarried people, and some of the property owned by married people, is 
generally derivatively called “separate” property.74  For example, prop-
erty acquired by a spouse during marriage, not by labor or its proceeds, 
but instead by gift, bequest, or inheritance, and the passive accretion 
thereon, generally is and remains the separate property of that spouse.75  
 
 71 Heinlein reaches the same conclusion in his fictional setting. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE 
MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 217 (1966) (“But he was clearly talking about marriage and nobody 
ever proposes another wedding in our marriage without first giving everybody a long careful chance 
to look the prospect over.  You just didn’t do it any other way! . . .‘In this family,’ Mum went on, 
‘we have always felt that our husbands should be allowed a veto.  Odd of us, perhaps, but Tillie 
started it and it has always worked well . . . .”). 
 72 See 1 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 2:5 (3d ed. 2010). 
 73 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (Westlaw 2010) (“Community property de-
fined,” “All property, other than that stated in NRS 123.130, acquired after marriage by either hus-
band or wife, or both, is community property unless otherwise provided by: 1. An agreement in writ-
ing between the spouses.”); TEXAS CONST. art. 16, § 15 (“All property, both real and personal, of a 
spouse owned or claimed before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent, 
shall be the separate property of that spouse; and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the 
rights of the spouses, in relation to separate and community property”).  Wisconsin calls this prop-
erty “marital property.” WIS. STAT. ANN. §766.31(3) (Westlaw 2010) (“Each spouse has a present 
undivided one-half interest in each item of marital property.”). All property acquired by married 
people during the marriage is presumptive marital property under Wisconsin law, see WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 766.31(1), (2) (Westlaw 2010), including “income earned or accrued by a spouse or attribut-
able to property of a spouse during marriage.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(4) (Westlaw 2010). 
 74 Wisconsin calls it “individual property.”  See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(7) (Westlaw 
2010). 
 75 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211(A) (Westlaw 2010) (“All property acquired by 
either husband or wife during the marriage is the community property of the husband and wife ex-
cept for property that is: 1. Acquired by gift, devise or descent.”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2341 
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Although the different community property states take various ap-
proaches at the more detailed level (for example, how to characterize the 
appreciation of an asset owned separately by one spouse before marriage, 
such as a business or a work of art), the basic concept is that, during mar-
riage, the community itself is the primary property-acquiring entity.  All 
property owned by a married person can be classified either as commu-
nity or separate.76  Enforceable pre- and postnuptial agreements may al-
low couples to adjust this classification to a greater or lesser degree.77 
Every marriage ends, either with death or divorce, and this requires 
the distribution of property.  If the marriage ends with the death of one 
spouse, half of the community property estate goes to the survivor, and 
the other half, allocated to the decedent spouse, passes by will or through 
 
(Westlaw 2010) (“The separate property of a spouse is his exclusively. It comprises: property ac-
quired by a spouse prior to the establishment of a community property regime; property acquired by 
a spouse with separate things or with separate and community things when the value of the commu-
nity things is inconsequential in comparison with the value of the separate things used; property ac-
quired by a spouse by inheritance or donation to him individually; damages awarded to a spouse in 
an action for breach of contract against the other spouse or for the loss sustained as a result of fraud 
or bad faith in the management of community property by the other spouse; damages or other in-
demnity awarded to a spouse in connection with the management of his separate property; and things 
acquired by a spouse as a result of a voluntary partition of the community during the existence of a 
community property regime.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.130 (Westlaw 2010) (“1. All property 
of the wife owned by her before marriage, and that acquired by her afterwards by gift, bequest, de-
vise, descent or by an award for personal injury damages, with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is 
her separate property. 2. All property of the husband owned by him before marriage, and that ac-
quired by him afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, descent or by an award for personal injury dam-
ages, with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is his separate property.”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
3.001 (Westlaw 2010), “Separate Property” (“A spouse’s separate property consists of: (1) the prop-
erty owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage; (2) the property acquired by the spouse during 
marriage by gift, devise, or descent; and (3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the 
spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during marriage.”); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 766.31(7) (Westlaw 2010) (“Property acquired by a spouse during marriage . . . is 
individual property if acquired by any of the following means: (a) By gift during lifetime or by a 
disposition at death by a 3rd person to that spouse and not to both spouses. A distribution of princi-
pal or income from a trust created by a 3rd person to one spouse is the individual property of that 
spouse unless the trust provides otherwise. (b) In exchange for or with the proceeds of other individ-
ual property of the spouse.”). 
 76 See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 760, 770 (Westlaw 2010). 
 77 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 100(b) (Westlaw 2010) (“Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a 
husband and wife may agree in writing to divide their community property on the basis of a non pro 
rata division of the aggregate value of the community property or on the basis of a division of each 
individual item or asset of community property, or partly on each basis. Nothing in this subdivision 
shall be construed to require this written agreement in order to permit or recognize a non pro rata 
division of community property.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712(b)(2) (Westlaw 2010) (in dividing 
assets, the court may consider “[a]ny antenuptial agreement of the parties; provided, however, that 
the court shall have no authority to amend or rescind any such agreement”); N.M. STAT. ANN § 40-
3A-1 – 3A-10 (Westlaw 2010) (Uniform Premarital Agreement Act); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58 
(Westlaw 2010) (including prenuptial agreements with marital property agreements). 
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intestacy.78  This treatment is uniform among the community property 
states, although the specific rules for intestate distribution of community 
property vary somewhat.79  If the marriage ends in divorce, the commu-
nity property estate is again divided between the former spouses, with 
different states using different principles to guide the distribution.  For 
example, California divides the community estate “equally,”80 Arizona 
divides it “equitably,”81 and Texas divides it “in a manner that the court 
deems just and right,” with no presumption of equality.82  Idaho divides 
the assets “in such proportions as the court . . . deems just,” although 
“compelling reasons” are required to deviate from “a substantially equal 
division in value.”83  But however the marital property is divided, com-
munity property law has always operated on the assumption that it would 
be divided between exactly two people.84  Plural marriage complicates 
this picture considerably. 
B. HOW MANY COMMUNITIES? 
After B, who is already married to A, marries C, is there now a sin-
gle community, including all three of them?  Or are there two communi-
 
 78 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 100(a) (Westlaw 2010), (“Upon the death of a married per-
son, one-half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse and the other half belongs 
to the decedent.”). 
 79 In California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington, the surviving spouse receives 
the intestate decedent’s entire share of the community property. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(a) (West-
law 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-102(b) (Westlaw 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.250(1)(b)(1) 
(Westlaw 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-102(B) (Westlaw 2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 
11.04.015(1)(a) (Westlaw 2010). In Arizona, Texas  and Wisconsin, the surviving spouse receives 
the decedent’s entire share of the community property only if the decedent has no issue or all issue 
are also issue of the surviving spouse. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §14-2102(1) (Westlaw 2010); TEX. 
PROB. CODE § 45(a) (Westlaw 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.01(a)(1) (Westlaw 2010). In Louisi-
ana, the surviving spouse receives the decedent’s community property only if the decedent has no 
issue at all.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 889 (Westlaw 2010). 
 80 CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (Westlaw 2010) (“Except upon the written agreement of the par-
ties, or on oral stipulation of the parties in open court, or as otherwise provided in this division, in a 
proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties, the court shall . . . divide 
the community estate of the parties equally.”). 
 81 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 A (Westlaw 2010) (“In a proceeding for dissolution of 
the marriage . . . the court shall assign each spouse’s sole and separate property to such spouse. It 
shall also divide the community, joint tenancy and other property held in common equitably, though 
not necessarily in kind, without regard to marital misconduct.”). 
 82 TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001 (Westlaw 2010) (“In a decree of divorce or annulment, the court 
shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, hav-
ing due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.”). 
 83 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712(1), (1)(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 84 But see, Hafner v. Hafner (In re Estate of Hafner), 229 Cal. Rptr. 676, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986), and cases discussed therein, dividing decedent’s property between a surviving spouse and an 
innocent putative bigamous spouse. 
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ties, one including A and B, and the other including B and C?  Is B part 
of one community, with more than two members, or part of multiple but 
separately dyadic communities?  Do we reach a different result if A also 
marries C?  These questions are both abstract and concrete.  How many 
communities have been created must be determined in order to character-
ize the property of a plurally married person correctly.  The number of 
communities has a tremendous impact on the principles of division that 
will apply when the marriage ends, making the structure of the marriage 
or marriages a very important decision that either policymakers or par-
ticipants in legalized plural marriage would need to make. 
Analyzing each marriage as creating a new community is simpler 
than regarding plural marriages as creating an ever-larger community 
with a variable number of members.  If each marriage is analogized to a 
business venture, it is comparatively straightforward to see how one 
would do the accounting for two marriages that begin at different times, 
involve different people, generate different revenue, and so on.  One 
community would be created by A and B’s marriage, a second commu-
nity by B’s marriage to C, and so on.  However, the multiple-
communities approach runs into an immediate problem from community 
property law.  How are we to determine the contribution of the already-
married person to the new community?  That spouse’s labor already be-
longs, in its entirety, to the first community, with nothing “left over” to 
contribute to the second.85  If B is married to both A and C, how much of 
B’s marital earnings go to the A  B community, and how much to the 
B  C community? 
The natural suggestion is that, beginning with the second marriage, 
the earnings of the plurally married person are divided into 1/n shares, 
where n = the number of spouses that person has (or the number of 
communities of which that person is a part).  A person with one spouse 
contributes 1/1, or all, earnings to that community; with two, 1/2 goes to 
each community; with three, 1/3 to each, and so on.  This avoids the un-
fairness of all unions after the first marriage receiving contributions only 
from the later spouse(s) (C, in our example), and guides allocation in a 
group marriage.  But is it fair to A who, prior to the B  C marriage, 
was part of a community that benefited from the entire earnings of both 
of its members?  A legal doctrine to regulate this diminution in the com-
munity estate is necessary.  Fortunately, we already have one – transmu-
tation. 
 
 85 CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (Westlaw 2010) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all 
property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while 
domiciled in this state is community property.” (emphasis added)). 
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C. MULTIPLE COMMUNITIES AND TRANSMUTATION 
“Transmutation” is the term for the reclassification of assets from 
community to separate property, or vice versa.86  When a spouse’s con-
tribution to the first community is reduced from all earnings to 1/n (and 
then to 1/(n+1) with each subsequent marriage), and those earnings be-
come the property of the second community, this is a transmutation of 
that fractional share of the first community’s property into the second 
community’s property. 
In California, transmutation of community property is governed by 
the Family Code.  California Family Code Section 850 provides that 
“married persons may by agreement or transfer, with or without consid-
eration . . . (a) Transmute community property to separate property of ei-
ther spouse[,] (b) Transmute separate property of either spouse to com-
munity property[,] (c) Transmute separate property of one spouse to 
separate property of the other spouse.”87  Under California Family Code 
Section 852(a), “[a] transmutation of real or personal property is not 
valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, 
joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the 
property is adversely affected.”88 
 
 86 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), defines “transmutation” as “[a] change in the 
nature of something; esp., in family law, the transformation of separate property into marital prop-
erty, or of marital property into separate property.”  In Wisconsin, this is called “reclassification.”  
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(10) (Westlaw 2010). 
 87 CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (Westlaw 2010). 
 88 CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(a) (Westlaw 2010); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906 (West-
law 2010); Borghi v. Gilroy (In re Estate of Borghi), 169 P.3d 847 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (requiring 
a writing). The Texas Constitution enshrines similar principles: “[P]ersons about to marry and 
spouses, without the intention to defraud pre-existing creditors, may by written instrument from time 
to time partition between themselves all or part of their property, then existing or to be acquired, or 
exchange between themselves the community interest of one spouse or future spouse in any property 
for the community interest of the other spouse or future spouse in other community property then 
existing or to be acquired, whereupon the portion or interest set aside to each spouse shall be and 
constitute a part of the separate property and estate of such spouse or future spouse; spouses also 
may from time to time, by written instrument, agree between themselves that the income or property 
from all or part of the separate property then owned or which thereafter might be acquired by only 
one of them, shall be the separate property of that spouse; if one spouse makes a gift of property to 
the other that gift is presumed to include all the income or property which might arise from that gift 
of property; spouses may agree in writing that all or part of their community property becomes the 
property of the surviving spouse on the death of a spouse; and spouses may agree in writing that all 
or part of the separate property owned by either or both of them shall be the spouses’ community 
property.” TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 15.  Wisconsin law provides that, “Spouses may reclassify their 
property by gift, conveyance . . . signed by both spouses, marital property agreement, [or] written 
consent . . . . If a spouse gives property to the other spouse and intends at the time the gift is made 
that the property be the individual property of the donee spouse, the income from the property is the 
individual property of the donee spouse unless a contrary intent of the donor spouse regarding the 
classification of income is established.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(10) (Westlaw 2010).  But see 
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The 1/n transmutation model for subsequent marriage is not only the 
fairest to all the spouses; a transmutation approach also demonstrates the 
necessity for requiring the consent of any existing spouse to any subse-
quent marriage, precisely because each subsequent marriage diminishes 
any prior community’s share of the multiply married partner’s earnings.  
Because B’s salary is going to be divided between the community of 
which A is a part and the new community of which C is a part, A’s con-
sent must be obtained.89  More formally, because any contribution to the 
community estate of the subsequent marriage from the earnings of the 
already-married spouse requires a transmutation of that spouse’s earnings 
under section 852(a), a writing joined in or consented to “by the spouse 
whose interest in the property is adversely affected” is required.90  Oth-
erwise, A is being deprived of a vested interest in property, and B is in 
breach of the fiduciary duty spouses owe to one another.91 
The transmutation doctrine can handle line and daisy-chain mar-
riages quite easily.  If, after A’s marriage to B, and then B’s to C, C 
wishes to marry D, the same analysis will apply.  B’s consent is required, 
but not A’s, because A’s property interests are not adversely affected.  If 
A and B are already married, and C and D are already married, when B 
and C wish to marry, the consent of both A and D is required.  If B and C 
marry, their default contributions to the new B  C community will be 
1/2 of each of their earnings, with the other half going to the A  B and 
C  D communities, respectively.  Alternatively, of course, B and C 
could enter into a binding prenuptial agreement by which they contrib-
uted a different fraction (or none) of their earnings to the B  C com-
munity.92 
Both to acknowledge plural marriage, and to facilitate allocations 
other than strictly 1/n, a further subpart could be added to section 850, to 
wit, “married persons may by agreement or transfer, with or without con-
 
Macias v. Macias, 968 P.2d 814, 818 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring “clear and convincing evi-
dence of spousal intent” to transmute from separate to community); Sprenger v. Sprenger, 878 P.2d 
284, 286 (Nev. 1994) (same). 
 89 See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 850, 852(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 90 CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(a) (Westlaw 2010); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-906; Borghi 
v. Gilroy (In re Estate of Borghi),169 P.3d 847, 849 (requiring a writing). 
 91 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-2 (Westlaw 2010) (“Either husband or wife may enter 
into any engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other person respecting property, 
which either might, if unmarried; subject, in transactions between themselves, to the general rules of 
common law which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each 
other.”). 
 92 Agreements not to create community property are enforceable.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 1500 
(Westlaw 2010).  Query whether, if A and B, and C and D, respectively, had made such agreements, 
B and C still to need the consent of A and D to marry.  Whether A and B, and C and D, have also 
waived inheritance rights may be relevant. 
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sideration . . . (d) Transmute community property of one marriage to 
community property of another marriage.”  Alternatively, § 850(a) could 
be used to transmute a fractional share of a spouse’s earnings to the sepa-
rate property of that spouse, which could then be transmuted by that 
spouse into the community property of the subsequent marriage under 
section 850(b). 
D. THE ONE-COMMUNITY MODEL 
The multiple-communities approach works well enough for plural 
marriage to be a suitable default rule.  But for group marriages, in which 
each spouse is married to each of the other spouses, as well as some 
asymmetric, line, or daisy-chain marriages, a one-community approach 
may better reflect the expectations, intentions, and behavior of the par-
ties.  The one-community approach might be more accurate, for example, 
for marriages in which everyone lives together, and all earnings are 
pooled – in which the group members think of themselves as one family.  
This model also may be more appropriate when the marriages happen 
simultaneously or very close together in time.  Under the one-community 
approach, C’s earnings after marriage to A and B would simply be added 
to the community estate acquired by A and B over the years of their prior 
marriage.  Members of such groups may or may not all be married to one 
another,93 and they may or may not all be sexually intimate, but they 
form one marital community for community property purposes. 
Because one goal of legalizing plural marriage is to increase the 
freedom of adults to order their intimate affairs as they wish, plurally 
married people ought to have the option of creating multiple communi-
ties or just one, either before or during any marriage, and the appropriate 
treatment of their marital property upon the death of a spouse or a disso-
lution of a marriage will then depend upon how the relationships are 
characterized.  With multiple communities as the default rule, one-
community treatment would require evidence of the parties’ intent and of 
their subsequent conduct.94 
 
 93 For example, in FLDS-style polygamy, while the “sister wives” are not married to each 
other, and are not sexually intimate, they do regard themselves as one family (hence the nomencla-
ture), and often a man will marry women who are related to each other.  The families of one man 
often function as a single economic unit, sometimes living together, often pooling earnings, and so 
on. CAROLYN JESSOP, ESCAPE (2007). 
 94 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402; Dye v. Battles (In re Estate of Dye), 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that decedent was presumed to know the default intestacy rules, and 
such rules applied without other evidence that decedent did not intend for those rules to apply). 
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VI. DISTRIBUTION AT DEATH 
Proverbially, a marriage lasts “‘til death do us part,” at which point 
the marital property needs to be divided.  Community property states uni-
formly divide the community estate at death, with half going to the sur-
viving spouse by operation of law,95 and the other half disposed of by 
will or intestacy.96  For intestate decedents, all of the community prop-
erty generally goes to the surviving spouse, 97 with separate property di-
 
 95 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.250(1) (Westlaw 2010) (“upon the death of either hus-
band or wife: (a) An undivided one-half interest in the community property is the property of the 
surviving spouse and his or her sole separate property.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 861.01(1) (“Upon the 
death of either spouse, the surviving spouse retains his or her undivided one-half interest in each 
item of marital property.”). 
 96 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-805(A) (Westlaw 2010) (“Upon the death of either 
spouse, one-half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse, and the other half is 
subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.02.070 
(Westlaw 2010) (“upon the death of a decedent, a one-half share of the community property shall be 
confirmed to the surviving spouse or surviving domestic partner, and the other one-half share shall 
be subject to testamentary disposition by the decedent, or shall descend [intestate]”). 
 97 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(a) (Westlaw 2010).  Four other community property states do 
not condition the surviving spouse’s share of the community estate of the decedent on the existence 
or otherwise of issue or close family.  See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-102(b) (“As to community 
property: (1) The one-half (1/2) of community property which belongs to the decedent passes to the 
surviving spouse.”); NEV. REV. STAT. 123.250(1)(b) (“The remaining interest [the decedent’s one-
half interest in community property]: (1) Is subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent or, 
in the absence of such a testamentary disposition, goes to the surviving spouse.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 45-2-102(B) (“[A]s to community property, the one-half of the community property as to which 
the decedent could have exercised the power of testamentary disposition passes to the surviving 
spouse.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015(1) (Westlaw 2010) (“The surviving spouse or state regis-
tered domestic partner shall receive the following share: (a) All of the decedent’s share of the net 
community estate . . . .”). In the remaining four, even the descent of the community estate depends 
on whether the decedent has issue, and in Arizona, Texas and Wisconsin, it depends further on 
whether those issue are children of the surviving spouse.  Arizona is the most severe; under  ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102(1) (Westlaw 2010), the surviving spouse receives all of the decedent’s 
community property “1. If there is no surviving issue or if there are surviving issue all of whom are 
issue of the surviving spouse also . . . ” but “[i]f there are surviving issue one or more of whom are 
not issue of the surviving spouse . . . no interest in the one-half of the community property that be-
longed to the decedent.”  Under TEX. PROB. CODE § 45 (Westlaw 2010), “(a) On the intestate death 
of one of the spouses to a marriage, the community property estate of the deceased spouse passes to 
the surviving spouse if: (1) no child or other descendant of the deceased spouse survives the de-
ceased spouse; or (2) all surviving children and descendants of the deceased spouse are also children 
or descendants of the surviving spouse. (b) On the intestate death of one of the spouses to a mar-
riage, if a child or other descendant of the deceased spouse survives the deceased spouse and the 
child or descendant is not a child or descendant of the surviving spouse, one-half of the community 
estate is retained by the surviving spouse and the other one-half passes to the children or descendants 
of the deceased spouse.” In Wisconsin, the surviving spouse receives the entire estate (marital and 
individual property), “If there are no surviving issue of the decedent, or if the surviving issue are all 
issue of the surviving spouse and the decedent.” WIS. STAT. ANN § 852.01(1)(a)(1) (Westlaw 2010).  
Louisiana also gives issue an interest in an intestate’s community estate, but in a distinctive way. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 889 (Westlaw 2010), “Devolution of community property,” states, “If the 
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vided between the surviving spouse and issue or close family of the de-
cedent.98  In this section, proposed revised probate statutes are presented.  
 
deceased leaves no descendants, his surviving spouse succeeds to his share of the community prop-
erty.” But LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 890 (Westlaw 2010), “Usufruct of surviving spouse,” provides, 
“If the deceased spouse is survived by descendants, the surviving spouse shall have a usufruct over 
the decedent’s share of the community property to the extent that the decedent has not disposed of it 
by testament. This usufruct terminates when the surviving spouse dies or remarries, whichever oc-
curs first.” 
 98 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(c) (Westlaw 2010). Idaho divides the separate property between 
a surviving spouse and issue or parents. “The intestate share of the surviving spouse is as follows: (a) 
As to separate property: (1) If there is no surviving issue or parent of the decedent, the entire intes-
tate estate; (2) If there is no surviving issue but the decedent is survived by a parent or parents, one-
half (1/2) of the intestate estate; (3) If there are surviving issue of the deceased spouse, one-half (1/2) 
of the intestate estate.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-102 (Westlaw 2010).  Nevada’s approach is simi-
lar to California’s, in giving all of the separate property estate to the surviving spouse of an intestate 
decedent without issue or close family, one-half if there is one child or issue of a predeceased child, 
and one-third if there are issue of more than one child.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.040 (Westlaw 2010) 
(“1. If the decedent leaves a surviving spouse and only one child, or the lawful issue of one child, the 
estate goes one-half to the surviving spouse and one-half to the child or the issue of the child. 2. If 
the decedent leaves a surviving spouse and more than one child living, or a child and the lawful issue 
of one or more deceased children, the estate goes one-third to the surviving spouse and the remain-
der in equal shares to the children and the lawful issue of any deceased child by right of representa-
tion.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.050 (Westlaw 2010) (“1. If the decedent leaves no issue, the estate 
goes one-half to the surviving spouse, one-fourth to the father of the decedent and one-fourth to the 
mother of the decedent, if both are living. If both parents are not living, one-half to either the father 
or the mother then living. 2. If the decedent leaves no issue, or father or mother, one-half of the sepa-
rate property of the decedent goes to the surviving spouse and the other one-half goes in equal shares 
to the brothers and sisters of the decedent. 3. If the decedent leaves no issue or surviving spouse, the 
estate goes one-half to the father of the decedent and one-half to the mother of the decedent, if both 
are living. If both parents are not living, the whole estate goes to either the father or the mother then 
living. 4. If the decedent leaves no issue, father, mother, brother or sister, or children of any issue, all 
of the separate property of the decedent goes to the surviving spouse.”). New Mexico gives all of the 
intestate separate property to the surviving spouse if there are no issue, but only one-quarter if there 
are issue, without reference to other surviving family.  N.M. STAT. ANN., § 45-2-102(A) (Westlaw 
2010) (“The intestate share of the surviving spouse is determined as follows: . . . as to separate prop-
erty: (1) if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the entire intestate estate; or (2) if there is sur-
viving issue of the decedent, one-fourth of the intestate estate . . . .”). The Texas Probate Code 
(which refers to separate property as the “personal estate”) limits the spousal share to one-third if the 
decedent had issue or close family, and also treats real property different than personal property.  
TEX. PROB. CODE § 38(b) (Westlaw 2010) (“Intestate Leaving Husband or Wife,” stating, “Where 
any person having title to any estate, real, personal or mixed, other than a community estate, shall 
die intestate as to such estate, and shall leave a surviving husband or wife, such estate of such intes-
tate shall descend and pass as follows: 1. If the deceased have a child or children, or their descen-
dants, the surviving husband or wife shall take one-third of the personal estate, and the balance of 
such personal estate shall go to the child or children of the deceased and their descendants. The sur-
viving husband or wife shall also be entitled to an estate for life, in one-third of the land of the intes-
tate, with remainder to the child or children of the intestate and their descendants. 2. If the deceased 
have no child or children, or their descendants, then the surviving husband or wife shall be entitled 
to all the personal estate, and to one-half of the lands of the intestate, without remainder to any per-
son, and the other half shall pass and be inherited according to the rules of descent and distribution; 
provided, however, that if the deceased has neither surviving father nor mother nor surviving broth-
ers or sisters, or their descendants, then the surviving husband or wife shall be entitled to the whole 
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While the revised statutes proposed here may be a bit unwieldy, this sec-
tion is intended to demonstrate that each state’s current basic approach to 
the division of community property upon the death of a spouse, and to 
the intestate succession both of community and separate property in that 
event, can be preserved intact, while simultaneously accommodating 
multiple forms of plural marriage. 
California Probate Code Section 100(a) provides that “[u]pon the 
death of a married person, one-half of the community property belongs to 
the surviving spouse and the other half belongs to the decedent.”99  Cali-
fornia Probate Code Section 6401(a) states that “[a]s to community prop-
erty, the intestate share of the surviving spouse is the one-half of the 
community property that belongs to the decedent under Section 100.”100  
The California Probate Code thus ensures that every surviving spouse re-
ceives no less than half of the community property estate, under section 
100(a), and may receive all of it from an intestate decedent, under section 
6401(a). 
For a plurally married person, the statutes’ references to “the com-
 
of the estate of such intestate.”). Washington also divides the separate estate between the surviving 
spouse and issue (without reference to the other parent) or close family.  WASH. REV. CODE § 
11.04.015(1) (Westlaw 2010) (“The surviving spouse or state registered domestic partner shall re-
ceive the following share . . . (b) One-half of the net separate estate if the intestate is survived by 
issue; or (c) Three-quarters of the net separate estate if there is no surviving issue, but the intestate is 
survived by one or more of his parents, or by one or more of the issue of one or more of his or her 
parents; or (d) All of the net separate estate, if there is no surviving issue nor parent nor issue of par-
ent.”). In Wisconsin, the surviving spouse receives all of the separate (or what Wisconsin calls “in-
dividual” property) “if there are no surviving issue of the decedent, or if the surviving issue are all 
issue of the surviving spouse and the decedent,” but “[i]f there are surviving issue one or more of 
whom are not issue of the surviving spouse, one-half of decedent’s property other than the following 
property: a. The decedent’s interest in marital property. b. The decedent’s interest in property held 
equally and exclusively with the surviving spouse as tenants in common.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.01 
(Westlaw 2010).  Louisiana’s approach is unique: Louisiana Civil Code article 891, titled “Devolu-
tion of separate property . . .,” provides, “If the deceased leaves no descendants but is survived by a 
father, mother, or both, and by a brother or sister, or both, or descendants from them, the brothers 
and sisters or their descendants succeed to the separate property of the deceased subject to a usufruct 
in favor of the surviving parent or parents. If both parents survive the deceased, the usufruct shall be 
joint and successive.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 891 (Westlaw 2010). Under Louisiana Civil Code 
article 892, “[i]f the deceased leaves neither descendants nor parents, his brothers or sisters or de-
scendants from them succeed to his separate property in full ownership to the exclusion of other as-
cendants and other collaterals.  If the deceased leaves neither descendants nor brothers or sisters, nor 
descendants from them, his parent or parents succeed to the separate property to the exclusion of 
other ascendants and other collaterals.” Only if there is no family at all, does a surviving spouse take 
separate property intestate; it is not divided into shares. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 892 (Westlaw 
2010). Louisiana Civil Code article 894,titled “Separate property; rights of surviving spouse,” pro-
vides, “If the deceased leaves neither descendants, nor parents, nor brothers, sisters, or descendants 
from them, his spouse not judicially separated from him shall succeed to his separate property to the 
exclusion of other ascendants and other collaterals.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 894 (Westlaw 2010). 
 99 CAL. PROB. CODE § 100(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 100 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
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munity property” and “the surviving spouse” are insufficiently precise 
terms.  A proposed Revised California Probate Code Section 100(a), with 




“Marital community.”  A “marital community” refers to two or more 
persons, 
(i) at least two of whom are married to one another, 
(ii) each of whom is married to at least one of the others, and 
(iii) who form one community for community property purposes. 
“Surviving community.”  A “surviving community” refers to a marital 
community, 
(i) at least two of whom are married to one another at the dece-
dent’s death, 
(ii) at least one of whom was married to the decedent, and 
(iii) who continue the marital community after the decedent’s 
death. 
 
Upon the death of a married person, as to any marital community of 
 which the decedent was a member, 
(i) If there is exactly one surviving spouse and no other surviving 
member of the marital community, one-half of the community 
property belongs to the surviving spouse and the other half be-
longs to the decedent. 
(ii)  If there is more than one surviving spouse, but no surviving 
community, a fractional share of the community property of each 
marriage, whose numerator is 1 and whose denominator is the 
number of members of that marital community including the de-
cedent, belongs to the decedent, and the remaining share belongs 
to the surviving spouse(s) as their separate property. 
(iii) If all surviving spouses are members of a surviving commu-
nity, a fractional share of the community property, whose nu-
merator is 1 and whose denominator is the number of members of 
the surviving community plus 1, belongs to the decedent, and the 
remaining share belongs to the surviving community as commu-
nity property. 
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(iv) If there are three or more surviving spouses, at least one of 
whom wishes not to continue the marital community, and at least 
two of whom wish to continue the marital community, the frac-
tional share of the community property, whose numerator is 1 
and whose denominator is the number of surviving spouses plus 
1, belongs to the decedent, and the remaining shares belong to 
the surviving spouses and the surviving community on a per-
capita basis. 
 
Obviously, subdivisions (ii), (iii), and (iv) introduce the most sig-
nificant innovations.  The “surviving community,” as a post-mortem 
holder of community property, is a new concept in marital law, as are the 
expansion of the marital community beyond two persons, and any frac-
tional division reflecting the possibility of more than one surviving 
spouse.101  When a monogamous marriage ends in death, there is exactly 
one formerly married person who is still alive.  That person is the “sur-
viving spouse.”  Revised California Probate Code Section 100(a)(i) cov-
ers this situation, as well as plural marriages in which the death of a per-
son leaves just one surviving spouse – for example, the death of a plural 
wife in asymmetric androcentric polygamy (with a multiple-communities 
analysis), or the death of a person at either “end” of a line marriage. 
In some cases, a person dies with multiple spouses, but those 
spouses are not married to, nor do they form one marital community 
with, one another.  Alternatively, the survivors and decedent may have 
formed one marital community during the decedent’s life, but it ends 
with the decedent’s death.  This would typically be the situation after the 
death of a husband with multiple wives.  In such situations, Revised Cali-
fornia Probate Code Section 100(a)(ii) directs us to identify the commu-
nity estate of each marriage, and allocate a fractional share (1/n) to the 
heirs or devisees of the decedent, and 1/n to each surviving spouse of that 
marriage (as separate property).  Doing this more than once, because the 
decedent leaves multiple surviving spouses, is no great complication.  If 
this person dies intestate, the entire community property estate of each 
 
 101 Revised CAL. PROB. CODE § 100(a)(i) and (ii) also owe something to a line of California 
cases involving the division of an intestate estate between a surviving spouse and a bigamous puta-
tive spouse.  In Estate of Hafner, the court reviewed these cases and concluded, “every court which 
has considered the issue of succession to a decedent’s intestate estate, as between a surviving legal 
spouse and a surviving putative spouse, has awarded one-half of the quasi-marital property to the 
putative spouse and the other half to the legal spouse, or spouse and children.” Hafner v. Hafner (In 
re Estate of Hafner), 229 Cal. Rptr. 676, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).  A tentative move in this same 
direction is suggested by Michèle Alexandre, Lessons from Islamic Polygamy: A Case for Expand-
ing the American Concept of Surviving Spouse so as to Include de Facto Polygamous Spouses, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461 (2007). 
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marriage reverts to the survivor(s), just as it would for a monogamous 
surviving spouse.102 
However, group marriages, in which everyone is married to every-
one, or asymmetric polygamous or daisy-chain marriages in which the 
spouses form a single marital community, render this treatment both in-
accurate and undesirable.  Although we need to carve out a devisable, 
descendible separate property share for the deceased spouse, the entirety 
of the marital property should not be “divvied up” among the remaining 
spouses in individual separate property slices.  In such cases, it is not ac-
curate to speak of a “surviving spouse” or even of “surviving spouses” 
because the marriage is ongoing, and the marital community survives the 
loss of one spouse.  After the deceased spouse’s share is calculated, what 
remains should retain its community property character.  Revised Cali-
fornia Probate Code Section 100(a)(iii) uses the new concept of the “sur-
viving community” to cover this situation.103 
 
 102 See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 100(a), 6401(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 103 This innovation will also allow us to revise the statutes of the other community property 
states.  For example, Nevada revised Statutes section 123.250(1) currently reads, “upon the death of 
either husband or wife: (a) An undivided one-half interest in the community property is the property 
of the surviving spouse and his or her sole separate property.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.250(1) (West-
law 2010).  Together with the new definitions, Revised § 123.250(1) would read, “Upon the death of 
any husband or wife, (a) If there is exactly one surviving spouse and no other surviving member of 
the marital community, an undivided one-half interest in the community property is the property of 
the surviving spouse and his or her sole separate property. (b) If there is more than one surviving 
spouse, but no surviving community, a fractional share of the community property of each marriage, 
whose numerator is 1 and whose denominator is the number of members of the marital community 
including the decedent, belongs to the decedent, and the remaining share is the property of the sur-
viving spouse(s) and is their sole separate property. (c) If there is a surviving community, a frac-
tional share of the community property, whose numerator is 1 and whose denominator is the number 
of members of the surviving community plus 1, belongs to the decedent, and the remaining share 
belongs to the surviving community as community property.” Similarly, New Mexico Statutes sec-
tion 45-2-805(A), which currently reads, “Upon the death of either spouse, one-half of the commu-
nity property belongs to the surviving spouse, and the other half is subject to the testamentary dispo-
sition of the decedent,” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-805(A) (Westlaw 2010), would be revised to read 
(along with the definitions), “Upon the death of any spouse, (a) If there is exactly one surviving 
spouse and no other surviving member of the marital community, o e-half of the community prop-
erty belongs to the surviving spouse, and the other half is subject to the testamentary disposition of 
the decedent,” (b) If there is more than one surviving spouse, but no surviving community, a frac-
tional share of the community property of each marriage, whose numerator is 1 and whose denomi-
nator is the number of members of the marital community including the decedent, is subject to the 
testamentary disposition of the decedent, and the remaining share belongs to the surviving 
spouse(s). (c) If there is a surviving community, a fractional share of the community property, whose 
numerator is 1 and whose denominator is the number of members of the surviving community plus 1, 
is subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent, and the remaining share belongs to the 
surviving community as community property.” Wisconsin Statutes section 861.01(1), which cur-
rently reads, “Upon the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse retains his or her undivided one-
half interest in each item of marital property,” WIS. STAT. ANN.  § 861.01(1) (Westlaw 2010) would 
be revised to read, “Upon the death of any spouse, (a) If there is exactly one surviving spouse and no 
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With this in place, we can turn to California Probate Code Section 
6401(a), covering intestate succession.  Section 6401(a) currently reads, 
“[a]s to community property, the intestate share of the surviving spouse 
is the one-half of the community property that belongs to the decedent 
under Section 100.” 
To track Revised California Probate Code Section 100(a), Califor-
nia Probate Code Section 6401(a) can be amended to read, 
 
As to community property, 
(i) If there is exactly one surviving spouse and no other survivor of the 
marital community, the intestate share of the surviving spouse is the 
one-half of the community property that belongs to the decedent under 
Revised Section 100. 
(ii)If there is more than one surviving spouse, but no surviving com-
munity, the intestate share of each surviving spouse(s) is the fractional 
share of the community property of each community that belongs to 
the decedent under Revised Section 100, divided by the number of 
such spouses. 
(iii) If all surviving spouses are members of a surviving community, 
the intestate share of the surviving community is the fractional share 
of the community property that belongs to the decedent under Revised 
Section 100. 
(iv) If there are three or more surviving spouses, at least one of whom 
wishes not to continue the marital community, and at least two of 
whom wish to continue the marital community, the intestate share of 
the community property that belongs to the decedent under Revised 
Section 100 is to be divided per capita among the surviving spouses, 
with the shares allocated to surviving spouses in a surviving commu-
nity remaining the community property of that community. 
 
Note that Revised Section 6401(a)(iii), like all intestacy statutes, would 
only apply to those who die without a will.  Persons in plural marriages 
would still have the power to leave their 1/n share of the community 
 
other surviving member of the marital community, the surviving spouse retains his or her undivided 
one-half interest in each item of marital property, (b) If there is more than one surviving spouse, but 
no surviving community, each surviving spouse retains a fractional share of the community property 
of each marriage, resulting from subtracting from 1 a fraction whose numerator is 1 and whose de-
nominator is the number of members of the marital community including the decedent, divided by the 
number of such surviving spouses. (c) If there is a surviving community, the surviving community 
retains its undivided fractional interest in each item of marital property, a fractional interest calcu-
lated as 1 minus a fraction whose numerator is 1 and whose denominator is the number of members 
of the surviving community plus 1.” 
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property by will, including a holographic will, in most community prop-
erty states,104 to whomever they want. 
Finally, California Probate Code Section 6401(c) provides for the 
intestate distribution of the deceased spouse’s separate property: 
As to separate property, the intestate share of the surviving spouse or 
surviving domestic partner . . . is as follows: 
 
(1) The entire intestate estate if the decedent did not leave any surviv-
ing issue, parent, brother, sister, or issue of a deceased brother or sis-
ter. 
(2) One-half of the intestate estate in the following cases: 
(A) Where the decedent leaves only one child or the issue of one 
deceased child. 
(B) Where the decedent leaves no issue but leaves a parent or 
parents or their issue or the issue of either of them. 
(3) One-third of the intestate estate in the following cases: 
(A) Where the decedent leaves more than one child. 
(B) Where the decedent leaves one child and the issue of one or 
more deceased children. 
(C) Where the decedent leaves issue of two or more deceased 
children.105 
The basic idea is that the surviving spouse receives a decreasing 
amount of the intestate deceased spouse’s separate property, depending 
on how many children or other close family members the deceased 
 
 104 Holographic wills are valid under the laws of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Ne-
vada, and Texas. ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 14-2503 (Westlaw 2010) (requiring signature and material 
parts of the will to be in the testator’s handwriting); CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 6111 (Westlaw 2010) 
(same); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-503 (Westlaw 2010) (same); LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1588 
(Westlaw 2010) (written and signed by the testator, and dated); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.090 (West-
law 2010) (signature, date and material provisions are written by the hand of the testator); TEX. 
PROB. CODE ANN. § 60 (Westlaw 2010) (entirely written by the testator). Washington, Wisconsin, 
and New Mexico do not recognize holographic wills, but will probate such wills if they are valid 
where and when executed. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (Westlaw 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
853.05 (Westlaw 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-50654-1A-503 (Westlaw 2010). 
 105 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(c) (Westlaw 2010); accord ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2101 
(Westlaw 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-102 (Westlaw 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 134.040, 
134.050 (Westlaw 2010); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-102(A) (Westlaw 2010); TEXAS PROBATE CODE § 
38(b) (Westlaw 2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015 (Westlaw 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.01 
(Westlaw 2010); and LA. CIV. CODE art. 891, 892, and 894 (Westlaw 2010). 
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spouse has.106  This statute would be easy to modify, simply by changing 
the first sentence to read, “As to separate property, the intestate share of 
the surviving spouse, surviving domestic partner or surviving community 
. . . .”  With this amendment, if a member of a group marriage dies intes-
tate, childless, and without close family members, all of that person’s 
property will go to the surviving community; otherwise, the separate 
property will be split between the surviving community and any close 
family of the intestate, precisely tracking the existing intestacy statute. 
Most other community property states take an approach similar to 
that of California, and their laws could be similarly revised.  Arizona 
law, however, is different enough to warrant attention.107  One statute 
covers both the separate and community property estates of the decedent, 
but distributes them differently depending on whether the decedent left 
issue who are not also issue of the surviving spouse.  Under Arizona Re-
vised Statutes Section 14-2102(1), “the entire intestate estate,” “both 
separate property and the one-half of community property that belongs to 
the decedent, passes to the surviving spouse: 1.  If there is no surviving 
issue or if there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the surviving 
spouse also . . . .”108  But “[i]f there are surviving issue one or more of 
whom are not issue of the surviving spouse, [the surviving spouse’s share 
is] one-half of the intestate separate property and no interest in the one-
half of the community property that belonged to the decedent.”109  The 
surviving spouse in California always takes the entirety of an intestate 
decedent’s community property, while in Arizona, the decedent’s share 
goes to issue if the surviving spouse is not the other parent of all of the 
decedent’s issue.  In both states, the surviving spouse shares the dece-
dent’s separate property with the decedent’s issue. 
To accommodate plural marriage, Revised Section 14-2102(1) 
should read, 
The following part of the intestate estate, as to both separate property 
and the one-half of community property of each community that be-





 106 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(c) (Westlaw 2010). 
 107 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102 (Westlaw 2010). 
 108 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2102 (Westlaw 2010). 
 109 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102(2) (Westlaw 2010). 
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1.  If there is no surviving issue or if there are surviving issue all of 
whom are issue of the surviving spouse(s) also, and 
(a) there is exactly one spouse, the entire intestate estate passes to 
the surviving spouse. 
(b) there is more than one surviving spouse, but no surviving 
community, the intestate share of each surviving spouse is that 
fractional share of the intestate estate whose numerator is 1 and 
whose denominator is the number of surviving spouses. 
(c) there is a surviving community and no surviving spouses who 
are not members of that community, the entire intestate estate 
passes to the surviving community as community property. 
(d) there is at least one surviving community and at least one 
surviving spouse who is not a member of a surviving community, 
the one-half of community property of each community that be-
longs to the decedent passes to each surviving community, and 
the separate property of the decedent passes to the surviving 
spouses per capita as each spouse’s separate property. 
2. If there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue of 
any of the surviving spouse(s), one-half of the intestate separate prop-
erty to each surviving spouse per capita and no interest in the one-half 
of the community property that belonged to the decedent. 
This revised statute preserves Arizona’s policy choices for distributing 
community and separate property; surviving spouse(s) are the most fa-
vored heir(s) after issue. 
The revised statutes proposed here retain each state’s current basic 
approach to distribution at death, while simultaneously accommodating 
multiple forms of plural marriage.  In each case, the decedent spouse is 
given testamentary freedom over an appropriate share of the community 
property of the marital community or communities of which he or she 
was a part, and the pattern of intestate succession favors surviving 
spouses and issue of the decedent exactly as does current law.  The cen-
tral innovation, the idea of the “surviving community,” comes into play 
only when a proper functional analysis of the decedent’s specific plural 
marriage warrants one-community treatment.  Multiple communities, 
brought into being by each successive marriage, ending with the death of 
one spouse, and resulting in the distribution of the community property 
accumulated by that married couple, would be the default approach. 
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VII. DISTRIBUTION AT DIVORCE 
The lifetime dissolution of a marriage accomplishes an inter vivos 
severance of a given marital community, and, like the death of a spouse, 
requires distribution of community property.  Non-community property 
states, sometimes called “common law” or “equitable distribution” states, 
have historically used quite different principles to award marital property 
at divorce than were applied at the end of a lifelong marriage.  In these 
jurisdictions, a surviving spouse (however brief the marriage) is entitled 
to a “forced share” of marital property (usually one third);110 but at di-
vorce, after a “failed” marriage, courts traditionally divide property by 
employing principles of fault, need, and contribution, all of which could 
lead to quite unequal divisions of property.111 
Community property states approach things quite differently.  Six of 
the nine community property states either mandate equal division112 or 
start from that presumption.113  The suggested modified rules for plural 
marriage will also use that starting point.  However, the same factors that 
permit courts in some community property states to deviate from equal 
division in monogamous divorce – things like the duration of the mar-
riage(s), prenuptial agreements, earning potential and needs of each 
spouse, the existence of separate property, whether maintenance (ali-
mony) is being awarded, childcare and homemaking contributions, re-
tirement benefits114 – would also apply to dissolution of plural marriages. 
A. PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY DIVISION FOR DISSOLUTION OF PLURAL 
 MARRIAGES 
In many cases, the property division upon dissolution of one or 
more of a person’s plural marriages would require only minimal adjust-
ment of existing rules. 
 
 110 For a helpful discussion of the elective share, see Lawrence Waggoner, The Uniform Pro-
bate Code’s Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 104 (2003). 
 111 See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
773 (1996). 
 112 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (Westlaw 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(4)(b) (West-
law 2010); Ruggles v. Ruggles, 860 P.2d 182, 188 (N.M. 1993). 
 113 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712 (Westlaw 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(1)(b) 
(Westlaw 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.61(3) (Westlaw 2010). 
 114 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712 (Westlaw 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.61(3)(a)-(m) (West-
law 2010). 
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1. Dissolution that Ends a Community 
Any dissolution that ends a marital economic community permits 
and indeed requires the distribution of that community’s property to the 
former spouses in shares of 1/n, where n = the number of spouses.  This 
is the principle behind existing monogamous property division rules, like 
California’s, which states simply, “[e]xcept upon the written agreement 
of the parties . . . in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . the court 
shall . . . divide the community estate of the parties equally.”115  Where n 
= 2, “equally” of course means in half, and each former spouse is thus 
awarded half of the community property.  This model can be scaled: if A, 
B, and C are all married to one another, and all divorce one another, “di-
vid[ing] the community estate equally” means dividing it into three equal 
shares.  At most, we might wish to clarify the statute by amending it to 
read, in pertinent part, “in a proceeding for dissolution of any marriage    
. . . the court shall . . . divide the community estate of that marriage be-
tween the parties equally.”116 
As was described above, each marriage presumptively creates its 
own community for community property purposes, and therefore, each 
dissolution requires distribution of the community assets of that mar-
riage equally, or otherwise in accordance with state law.  Dissolution of 
one of multiple, distinct unions, for example in a line marriage or asym-
metric polygamy, falls within the existing rule.  If A is married to B, C, 
and D, the divorce of A from B will presumptively entitle A and B each 
to a share of the A  B community estate as his or her separate property, 
post-dissolution, and the divorce of A from C entitles each to a share of 
the A  C community estate.  The ongoing marriage of A to D, or of B 
to C, B to D, or C to D has no effect on this analysis. 
2. One Spouse Dissolving All Marriages of That Spouse 
Nor does A’s simultaneous divorce from multiple spouses with 
whom he or she formed a single economic community cause especially 
difficult problems, although it changes the calculations somewhat.  If A 
is married to B and C, and the three of them formed one economic com-
munity, A’s divorce from both of them entitles A, presumptively at least, 
to a 1/n share of the unified community estate, where n = 3.  This is dis-
 
 115 CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (Westlaw 2010). 
 116 Louisiana’s law, that “[t]he court shall divide the community assets and liabilities so that 
each spouse receives property of an equal net value,” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(4)(b) (Westlaw 
2010), needs no modification, though it might be clarified, “[t]he court shall divide the community 
assets and liabilities of each marriage so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value.” 
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tinct from the above example, where A receives half of two community 
estates, A  B and A  C.117  If A is married to B, C, and D, and they 
all form one community, A’s presumptive share upon divorcing them all 
is again 1/n, where n = 4.  The effect of one-community treatment is that 
only one community estate is divided, into fractional shares, rather than 
each of three communities being divided in half. 
3. Divorce from a Continuing Community 
But what do the others get?  In dividing property after dissolution, 
we must not only calculate, but also characterize, the property interests 
of all the affected spouses.  This is where the idea of the “continuing 
community” – a variation on the “surviving community” developed for 
the inheritance situation – comes in.  “Continuing community” treatment 
is presumptively appropriate if the spouses divorced by A are married to 
one another, and they all formed one economic community during A’s 
marriage(s) and will maintain that community after divorce by A.  In that 
event, A’s departure does not warrant a separate property award to each 
of them individually.  While A takes a 1/n share of the former commu-
nity estate as separate property, the rest of the property, the whole minus 
the 1/n share, remains the community estate of the “continuing commu-
nity.” 
In fact, this device is appropriate any time a person is divorced from 
a continuing community.  For example, if A is a radial spouse in asym-
metric polygamy who divorces the hub, the presumptive treatment would 
be to divide the assets of that marriage.  But even though A was only 
married to one person – the hub – the remaining group may qualify as a 
continuing community, so long as they all formed one economic com-
munity during A’s marriage and will continue as such, because the re-
maining spouses are still married to one another.  If so, A’s share would 
be 1/n of the entire community estate, with the rest remaining the com-
munity property of the hub and remaining radial spouses. 
We have thus far accounted for monogamous dissolution, the disso-
lution of one or more plural marriages susceptible to a multiple-
 
 117 Unlike most nonfiction legal commentators, Heinlein at least addresses these issues.  
ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 260 (1996) (“But let’s take one lady and 
two men as typical.  She decides to divorce one.  Say it’s friendly, with other husband agreeing and 
one she is getting rid of not making fuss.  Not that it would do him any good.  Okay, she divorce 
him; he leaves.  Still leaves endless things.  Men might be business partners, co-husbands often are.  
Divorce may break up partnership.  Money matters to settle.  This three may own cubic [real prop-
erty] together, and while will be in her name, ex-husband probably has cash coming or rent.  And 
almost always are children to consider, support and so forth.  Many things.  No, madam, divorce is 
never simple.”). 
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communities analysis, and the dissolution of all of a person’s marital ties 
to a continuing community of persons married to, and/or forming one 
economic community with, one another.  Each of these dissolutions 
completely severs a person’s relationship with a particular marital eco-
nomic community. 
4. Partial Divorce (Dissolution of Fewer than All Marriages Within a 
 Single Community) 
A different sort of problem is presented by someone who seeks to 
dissolve one or more of several marriages, while remaining a part of an 
ongoing economic community including one or more former and one or 
more present spouses.  The simplest case is when A, B, and C are all 
married to one another, the three of them form one economic commu-
nity, and then A and B (but not A and C) divorce.118  What property dis-
tribution should A receive?  We cannot properly award A half of the A 
 B community estate, because, by hypothesis, no A  B estate ever 
came into being – there is only the A  B  C estate.  Nor does it seem 
appropriate to award A 1/n of the entire community estate, because the 
line marriage or asymmetric group continues as an economic community, 
and furthermore, A is still part of that community.  One’s property rights 
as a member of one plurally married marital community do not depend 
on how many spouses one has, so long as the number is greater than one, 
but rather, on how many persons are in the community.119  The A  B 
dissolution does not change the number of persons in the community, 
and thus, A’s entitlement to a share of the community assets does not 
“vest” until the community ceases or A leaves it entirely.  Because of the 
ongoing A  C or A  D union, the dissolution of the A  B union 
does not satisfy either of these, and A is entitled to nothing at all.120  A’s 
change of marital status vis-à-vis B will not give the divorce court juris-
diction to divide any community estate. 
5. Dissolution that Increases the Number of Communities 
In still other cases, there may have been one community during the 
 
 118 The next-simplest case would be the “broken” B↔C↔D↔A one-community daisy chain, 
which becomes a line marriage after A divorces B but remains married to D. 
 119 We can see this by comparing the share received by A in departing completely from a one-
community four-person daisy chain marriage (A is married to B and D) with the share received by A 
in departing from a one-community four-person group marriage (A is married to B, C, and D).  A 
receives 1/n, or 1/4, in either case. 
 120 The author thanks Siobhan Mahaffey for a very useful conversation to this conclusion, as 
well as that contained in the next paragraph. 
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marriage, but there will not be one community post-dissolution.  The A 
 B dissolution may transform a one-community group marriage into a 












Figure 9 represents a daisy-chain marriage before and after dissolution of 
A  B union.  In the three-person case, the A  B dissolution turns the 
group marriage into asymmetric polygamy with C as the hinge and two 
communities.  Here, all-around 1/n treatment for the accumulated one-
community estate is the most straightforward and fair division.  Going 
forward, either each separate marriage would accumulate its own com-
munity property with fractional contributions from multiply married 
spouses, or suitable marital property transmutation agreements could be 
executed by any subgroup of three or more, wishing, for example, to “re-
constitute” one community. 
Ending just one of multiple unions that join someone to one plurally 
married community thus has somewhat surprising all-or-nothing effects.  
Counter-intuitively, A divorcing only from B potentially disrupts the ar-
rangements more than expelling A, or A leaving completely.  If all of the 
marriages that connect A to the group are dissolved, A can be awarded 
1/n and the continuing community keeps the remaining community estate 
as community property.  If not, A remains a member of an ongoing 
community with all the rights of a member, or the community ends, and 
multiple communities, organized around each marriage, take its place.  
There is no seamless way to extract A only partially from a complex web 
of marital arrangements that form a single economic community.  From 
one point of view, these rules prevent A from “eating his (or her) cake 
and having it, too” – taking as separate property a share of the commu-
nity property estate while remaining not just a contributing member, but 
also a beneficiary member of that very same community.  At the same 
time, so long as A remains a member of that community, being divorced 
by one of plural spouses will postpone, although not prevent, A’s enti-
tlement to a share of community property. 
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B. THE PROPOSED STATUTE 
In order to implement the approach described above, statutes gov-
erning division of property at divorce would require significant supple-
mentation.  California Family Code Section 2550 could be amended 
quite modestly, to read, “Subject to Section 2550.5, in a proceeding for 
dissolution of any marriage . . . the court shall . . . divide the community 
estate of that marital community between the parties equally.”  The pro-
posed additional section would read, 
 
Proposed Section 2550. 
“ Continuing community.”  A “continuing community” refers to a 
marital community, 
(i) at least one of whom was married to the former spouse, 
(ii) at least two of whom remain married to one another after dis-
solution, 
(iii) who formed a single economic community with the former 
spouse, and 
(iv) who intend to continue as a marital community after dissolu-
tion. 
If any party in a proceeding for dissolution of any marriage has more 
than one spouse, the court must make a determination as to the num-
ber of marital communities of which each such person is a part.  The 
community estate of each marital community for which dissolution of 
a marriage is sought is to be divided separately. For each such mari-
tal community of which the spouse obtaining dissolution will no longer 
be a part, the spouse shall be awarded a share of the community prop-
erty of that marital community equal to a fraction whose numerator is 
1 and whose denominator is the number of persons constituting that 
marital community prior to dissolution.  The remaining community es-
tate is to be awarded in equal shares to the other spouse(s) as sepa-
rate property, unless there is a continuing community.  If a continuing 
community is shown, the remaining community estate is retained by 
the continuing community as its community property. 
 
It follows from this rule that if a person is part of a plural marriage 
that is one marital community, and he or she seeks to dissolve one of the 
marriages without separating from the continuing community, the court 
will be without jurisdiction to make an award of community property to 
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that person at that time.  This result may encourage plurally married peo-
ple either to order their intimate and financial lives on a multiple-
communities model, or not to bother divorcing just one of multiple 
spouses in an ongoing marital community of which he or she intends to 
remain a part. 
Some of the “strategic” dimensions of this proposed approach 
quickly emerge.  Although the presumption is that each marriage creates 
its own community property estate, spouses may seek to overcome that 
presumption and obtain one-community treatment.  This will be driven 
by the fact that sometimes half of one marriage’s community estate will 
be considerably larger than a 1/n share of the aggregate community es-
tate.  Other times, however, it will be considerably smaller.  A radial 
spouse who was a very significant financial contributor to an asymmetric 
polygamous or line marriage might seek half of the assets of the commu-
nity to which he or she contributed, for example, a house purchased with 
savings from that spouse’s earnings, on a presumptive multiple-
communities approach, rather than settle for the potentially much smaller 
1/n share.  This divorcing spouse might argue that contributions from 
earnings to the upkeep of persons not his or her spouses were gifts or 
transmutations, not evidence of a single community.  The continuing 
community, by contrast, would argue for one-community treatment, re-
ducing the divorcing spouse’s share to 1/n.121 
Such disputes concerning the classification of particular assets as 
separate or community property, however, are not fundamentally differ-
ent in kind than those with which the probate and divorce courts are al-
ready familiar.122  Guidance in determining whether there are multiple 
communities or just one could be drawn from cases evaluating whether 
transmutation of separate into community property has occurred by 
“commingling” (for example, whether property was segregated, could be 
traced or identified, who managed it).123 
 
 121 Similar issues might arise upon the death of a plurally married person, depending on the 
disposition made by will. 
 122 See, e.g., Hatcher v. Hatcher, 933 P.2d 1222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); In re Marriage of 
Haines, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Fountain v. Fountain, 644 So. 2d 733 (La. Ct. 
App. 1994); In re Marriage of Hirsch, 259 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 123 For an interesting discussion of these issues, see Leslie Joan Harris, Tracing, Spousal 
Gifts, and Rebuttable Presumptions: Puzzles of Oregon Property Distribution Law, 83 OR. L. REV. 
1291 (2004). 
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C. APPLICATION IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES WITHOUT A 
 MANDATE OR PRESUMPTION OF EQUAL DIVISION 
For those community property states that adhere to strict equality in 
dividing marital property at divorce, Proposed Section 2550.5 or a very 
similar statute would be appropriate.  For those with only a presumption 
of equality, the concept of the “marital community” and “continuing 
community” still apply, but the crucial middle sentence should be modi-
fied to read, 
For each such marital community of which the spouse obtaining disso-
lution will no longer be a part, unless there are compelling reasons 
otherwise, the spouse shall be awarded a share of the community 
property of that marital community equal to a fraction whose numera-
tor is 1 and whose denominator is the number of persons constituting 
that marital community prior to dissolution. 
Deviations from equality would also permit a court to award a di-
vorcing plurally married spouse more than 1/n.  Idaho courts consider 
factors including duration of the marriage, prenuptial agreements, earn-
ing potential and needs of each spouse, whether maintenance (alimony) 
is being awarded, and retirement benefits.124  Wisconsin law directs the 
court to give “appropriate economic value” to “homemaking and child 
care services.”125  To the extent that some divorcing plural spouses might 
be comparatively disadvantaged in the job market because of lack of 
skills or numerous young children, these factors might well come into 
play.  The “source of income,” “needs,” and “present and potential earn-
ing capability”126 of a still-married spouse, including ongoing support 
from other spouses, for example, might warrant a quite unequal division 
in favor of the person departing the plural marriage. 
In states that guide the court’s marital property division with terms 
like “just,” “equitable,” and “right,”127 the key sentence might read: 
For each such marital community of which the spouse obtaining disso-
lution will no longer be a part, the spouse shall be awarded a just and 
equitable share of the community property of that marital community. 
Should such a statute be adopted, the more mathematically precise 
 
 124 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712(1)(b) (Westlaw 2010). 
 125 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.61(3)(d) (Westlaw 2010). 
 126 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712(1)(b) (Westlaw 2010). 
 127 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-318 (Westlaw 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 
(Westlaw 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (Westlaw 2010). 
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versions of the proposed statutes might at least provide some guidance, if 
not persuasive authority, as a starting point. 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis offered above is a first foray into thinking about how 
existing law in community property states might be modified not only to 
take account of plural marriage, but to carry out the parties’ expectations 
and do substantive justice between the spouses when those marriages, or 
the pairwise unions of which they are composed, inevitably end through 
death or divorce.  We have seen that the most significant determinant of 
the share a former spouse receives at dissolution is not whether the mar-
riage is asymmetric polygamy or group marriage, nor even how many 
spouses a person has, but whether the person is regarded as having been 
part of multiple communities or just one.  One-community treatment is 
available, and may be more functionally accurate and psychologically 
and emotionally apt, even in situations in which each person is not actu-
ally married to every other person, such as in androcentric asymmetric 
heterosexual polygamy.  While it may be administratively simplest to as-
sume that each marriage brings a new marital community into being, 
making this a suitable default rule, it is also clear that plural spouses 
ought to be able to “opt in” to one-community treatment if all affected 
spouses so desire.  In some contested probate or divorce cases, the court 
might find “one community,” and distribute property accordingly, even 
when not all persons in the marriage were married to one another.  The 
burden of proof would be on the surviving community to prove that the 
deceased or divorcing spouse is entitled only to a 1/n share of the entire 
community estate, rather than 1/2 of the community estate of each mar-
riage contracted by that departing or departed spouse. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that persons in plural marriages – 
like persons in conventional marriages – might do well to use prenuptial 
and marital property agreements to order their lives other than as sug-
gested here.  Nevertheless, it is likely that even if plural marriage were 
legalized, few people would take the trouble to make such agreements.128  
Therefore, default rules like intestacy statutes and principles of commu-
nity property division not only express a society’s best judgment about 
what justice requires and wisdom recommends in such situations, but 
also have a tremendous practical significance. 
It is hoped that the foregoing analysis, while not necessarily defini-
 
 128 See BRETT R. TURNER & LAURA W. MORGAN, ATTACKING AND DEFENDING MARITAL 
AGREEMENTS (2001). 
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tive on the question of how best to accommodate plural marriage into a 
community property state’s law, makes clear that it is possible to do so in 
harmony with the principles that guide current law.  Whatever the politi-
cal or social barriers to the legalization of plural marriage – and they may 
be insurmountable – it cannot fairly be said that it would be impossible 
to adjust our laws to take account of it. 
 
APPENDIX: LAWS AGAINST BIGAMY 
Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-13-1(a), (c) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person com-
mits bigamy when he intentionally contracts or purports to contract a marriage 
with another person when he has a living spouse. . . .  Bigamy is a Class C fel-
ony.”). 
Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 11.51.140(a)(1)-(3), (b) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person 
commits the crime of unlawful marrying if the person knowingly marries or 
purports to marry another when that person or the other is lawfully married to a 
third person; more than one person simultaneously; or a person who simultane-
ously is marrying another person.  Unlawful marrying is a class A misde-
meanor.”). 
Arizona: Ariz. Const. art. XX, para. 2 (“Polygamous or plural marriages, 
or polygamous cohabitation, are forever prohibited within this State.”). 
Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. § 13-3606(A) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person hav-
ing a spouse living who knowingly marries any other person is guilty of a class 
5 felony”); Ark. Code Ann. § 13-3607 (Westlaw 2010) (“A person who know-
ingly marries the spouse of another, in any case in which such spouse would be 
guilty of bigamy, is guilty of a class 5 felony.”); Ark Code Ann. § 5-26-201(a), 
(c) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person commits bigamy if, being married, he or she 
purports to marry another person. . . . Bigamy is a Class A misdemeanor.”). 
California : Cal. Penal Code § 281(a) (Westlaw 2010) (“Every person hav-
ing a husband or wife living, who marries any other person, except in the cases 
specified in § 282, is guilty of bigamy.”); Cal. Penal Code § 283 (Westlaw 
2010) (“Bigamy is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars 
($10,000) or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or in the 
state prison.”); Cal. Penal Code § 284 (Westlaw 2010) (“Every person who 
knowingly and willfully marries the husband or wife of another, in any case in 
which such husband or wife would be punishable under the provisions of this 
chapter, is punishable by fine not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by 
imprisonment in the state prison.”). 
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-110(1)(a) (Westlaw 2010) (“The 
following marriages are prohibited: A marriage entered into prior to the dissolu-
tion of an earlier marriage of one of the parties, except a currently valid mar-
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riage between the parties;”); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-6-201(1)-(2) (Westlaw 
2010) (“Any married person who, while still married, marries or cohabits in this 
state with another commits bigamy. . . . Bigamy is a class 6 felony.”); Colo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-6-202 (Westlaw 2010) (“Any unmarried person who know-
ingly marries or cohabits with another in this state under circumstances known 
to him which would render the other person guilty of bigamy under the laws of 
this state commits marrying a bigamist, which is a class 2 misdemeanor.”). 
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-190(a), (c) (Westlaw 2010) (“A 
person is guilty of bigamy when he marries or purports to marry another person 
in this state if either is lawfully married; or so marries or purports to marry an-
other person in any other state or country in violation of the laws thereof, and 
knowingly cohabits and lives with such other person in this state as husband and 
wife. . . . Bigamy is a class D felony.”). 
Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 1001 (Westlaw 2010) (“A person is 
guilty of bigamy when the person contracts or purports to contract a marriage 
with another person knowing the person has a living spouse, or knowing the 
other person has a living spouse. Bigamy is a class G felony.”). 
District of Columbia : D.C. Code § 22-501(a) (Westlaw 2010) (“Whoever, 
having a spouse or domestic partner living, marries or enters a domestic partner-
ship with another shall be deemed guilty of bigamy, and on conviction thereof 
shall suffer imprisonment for not less than 2 nor more than 7 years . . . .”). 
Florida : Fla. Stat. Ann. § 826.01 (Westlaw 2010) (“Whoever, having a 
husband or wife living, marries another person shall . . . be guilty of a felony of 
the third degree . . .”); Fla. Stat. Ann. §826.03 (Westlaw 2010) (“Whoever 
knowingly marries the husband or wife of another person, knowing him or her to 
be the spouse of another person, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree . . 
. .”). 
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-20(a), (c) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person 
commits the offense of bigamy when he, being married and knowing that his 
lawful spouse is living, marries another person or carries on a bigamous cohabi-
tation with another person. . . . A person convicted of the offense of bigamy 
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten 
years.”); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-21(a), (c) (Westlaw 2010) (“An unmarried man 
or woman commits the offense of marrying a bigamist when he marries a person 
whom he knows to be the wife or husband of another. . . . A person convicted of 
the offense of marrying a bigamist shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than one nor more than ten years.”). 
Hawai’i: Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-900(1), (2) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person 
commits the offense of illegally marrying if the person intentionally marries or 
purports to marry, knowing that the person is legally ineligible to do so.  Ille-
gally marrying is a petty misdemeanor.”). 
Idaho: Idaho Const. art. I, § 4 (“Bigamy and polygamy are forever prohib-
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ited in the state, and the legislature shall provide by law for the punishment of 
such crimes.”); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-1101 (Westlaw 2010) (“Every person 
having a husband or wife living, who marries any other person . . . is guilty of 
bigamy.”); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-1103 (Westlaw 2010) (“Bigamy is punishable 
by fine not exceeding $2,000 and by imprisonment in the state prison not ex-
ceeding three (3) years.”); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-1104 (Westlaw 2010) (“Every 
person who knowingly and wilfully marries the husband or wife of another, in 
any case in which such husband or wife would be punishable under the provi-
sions of this chapter, is punishable by fine not less than $2,000, or by imprison-
ment in the state prison not exceeding three (3) years.”). 
Illinois : 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-12(a), (c), 11-13(a), (b) (Westlaw 2010) 
(“Any person having a husband or wife who subsequently marries another or 
cohabits in this State after such marriage commits bigamy. . . . Bigamy is a 
Class 4 felony. . . . Any unmarried person who knowingly marries another under 
circumstances known to him which would render the other person guilty of big-
amy under the laws of this State, or who cohabits in this State after such a mar-
riage, commits the offense of marrying a bigamist.  Marrying a bigamist is a 
Class A misdemeanor.”); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/212(a)(1) (Westlaw 2010) (“The 
following marriages are prohibited: a marriage entered into prior to the dissolu-
tion of an earlier marriage of one of the parties . . . .”). 
Indiana: Ind. Code 35-46-1-2(a) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person who, being 
married and knowing that his spouse is alive, marries again commits bigamy, a 
Class D felony.”). 
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. § 726.1 (Westlaw 2010) (“Any person, having a 
living husband or wife, who marries another, commits bigamy. . . . Any person 
who marries another who the person knows has another living husband or wife 
commits bigamy.  Bigamy is a serious misdemeanor.”). 
Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3601(a)(1)-(3), (c) (repealed 2010).  (“Big-
amy is any of the following: Marriage within this state by any person who shall 
have another spouse living at the time of such marriage; marriage within this 
state by an unmarried person to a person known to such unmarried person to be 
the spouse of some other person; cohabitation within this state after marriage in 
another state or country under circumstances described in subsection (a)(1) or 
(a)(2). . . . Bigamy is a severity level 10, nonperson felony.”). 
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 530.010(1)(a)-(b), (3) (Westlaw 2010) (“A 
person is guilty of bigamy when he: Purports to marry another person knowing 
he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife; or 
Cohabits in this state after a bigamous marriage in another state. . . . Bigamy is a 
Class D felony.”). 
Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:76 (Westlaw 2010) (“Bigamy is the 
marriage to another person by a person already married and having a husband or 
wife living; or the habitual cohabitation, in this state, with such second husband 
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or wife, regardless of the place where the marriage was celebrated. . . . Whoever 
commits the crime of bigamy shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, 
or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or 
both.”); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:77 (Westlaw 2010) (“Abetting in bigamy is the 
marriage of an unmarried person to the husband or wife of another, with knowl-
edge of the fact that the party is married and without a reasonable and honest 
belief that such party is divorced or his marriage annulled, or that the party’s 
husband or wife is dead.  Whoever commits the crime of abetting in bigamy 
shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or with-
out hard labor, for not more than five years, or both.”); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 
88 (Westlaw 2010) (“A married person may not contract another marriage.”). 
Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 551(1), (2) (Westlaw 2010) (“A 
person is guilty of bigamy if, having a spouse, he intentionally marries or pur-
ports to marry, knowing that he is legally ineligible to do so.  Bigamy is a Class 
E crime.”). 
Maryland : Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-502(b)-(d) (Westlaw 2010) 
(“While lawfully married to a living person, a person may not enter into a mar-
riage ceremony with another.  A person who violates this section is guilty of the 
felony of bigamy and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 9 
years.  An indictment or warrant for bigamy is sufficient if it substantially states: 
‘(name of defendant) on (date), in (county), having a living spouse, feloniously 
entered into a marriage ceremony with (name of subsequent spouse), in violation 
of  § 10-502  of the Criminal Law Article, against the peace, government, and 
dignity of the State.’”). 
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 15 (Westlaw 2010) 
(“Whoever, having a former husband or wife living, marries another person or 
continues to cohabit with a second husband or wife in the commonwealth shall 
be guilty of polygamy, and be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 
not more than five years or in jail for not more than two and one half years or by 
a fine of not more than five hundred dollars . . . .”). 
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.5 (Westlaw 2010) (“No mar-
riage shall be contracted whilst either of the parties has a former wife or husband 
living, unless the marriage with such former wife or husband, shall have been 
dissolved.”); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.439 (Westlaw 2010) (“Any person 
who has a former husband or wife living, who shall marry another person, or 
shall continue to cohabit with such second husband or wife, in this state, he or 
she shall, except in the cases mentioned herein, be guilty of the crime of polyg-
amy, a felony.”); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.440 (Westlaw 2010) (“Any 
person who knowingly enters into a marriage with another, which is prohibited 
to the latter by the foregoing provisions of this chapter, is guilty of a felony.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.03(a)(1) (Westlaw 2010) (“The follow-
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ing marriages are prohibited: a marriage entered into before the dissolution of an 
earlier marriage of one of the parties becomes final . . . .”); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 
609.355, subdiv. 1, 2(1)-(3) (Westlaw 2010) (“In this section ‘cohabit’ means to 
live together under the representation or appearance of being married.  Whoever 
does any of the following is guilty of bigamy and may be sentenced to impris-
onment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than 
$10,000, or both: knowingly having a prior marriage that is not dissolved, con-
tracts a marriage in this state; or contracts a marriage with another in this state 
with knowledge that the prior marriage of the other is not dissolved; or marries 
another outside this state with knowledge that either of them has a prior  mar-
riage that has not been dissolved, and then cohabits with the other in this 
state.”). 
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-13 (Westlaw 2010) (“Every person 
having a husband or wife living, who shall marry again, and every unmarried 
person who shall knowingly marry the husband or wife of another living, except 
in the cases hereinafter named, shall be guilty of bigamy, and imprisoned in the 
penitentiary not longer than ten years.”). 
Missouri: Mo. Ann. Stat. § 568.010, 1(1)-(2), 4(1)-(2), 5 (Westlaw 2010) 
(“A married person commits the crime of bigamy if he: Purports to contract an-
other marriage; or Cohabits in this state after a bigamous marriage in another 
jurisdiction. . . . An unmarried person commits the crime of bigamy if he Pur-
ports to contract marriage knowing that the other person is married; or Cohabits 
in this state after a bigamous marriage in another jurisdiction.  Bigamy is a class 
A misdemeanor.”). 
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 40-1-401(1)(a) (Westlaw 2010) (“The fol-
lowing marriages are prohibited: a marriage entered into prior to the dissolution 
of an earlier marriage of one of the parties . . . “); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-
611(1), (2) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person commits the offense of bigamy if, while 
married, he knowingly contracts or purports to contract another marriage . . . . A 
person convicted of bigamy shall be fined not to exceed $500 or be imprisoned 
in the county jail for any term not to exceed 6 months, or both.”); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 45-5-612(1), (2) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person commits the offense of mar-
rying a bigamist if he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another 
knowing that the other is thereby committing bigamy.  A person convicted of the 
offense of marrying a bigamist shall be fined not to exceed $500 or be impris-
oned in the county jail for any period not to exceed 6 months, or both.”). 
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-701(1)-(3) (Westlaw 2010) “If any mar-
ried person, having a husband or wife living, shall marry any other person, he 
shall be deemed guilty of bigamy . . . . Any unmarried person who knowingly 
marries a person who is married commits bigamy.  Bigamy is a Class I misde-
meanor.”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-406 (Westlaw 2010) (“If any Indian who is mar-
ried according to the provisions of sections 42-402 to 42-404 shall, while his or 
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her husband or wife is living, be married to another person, either in legal form 
or according to Indian custom, he or she shall be guilty of bigamy and shall be 
punished therefor as provided by law.”). 
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.160(1), (2) (Westlaw 2010) (“Bigamy con-
sists in the having of two wives or two husbands at one time, knowing that the 
former husband or wife is still alive.  If a married person marries any other per-
son while the former husband or wife is alive, the person so offending is guilty 
of a category D felony . . . .”); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.170 (Westlaw 2010) (“If a 
person, being unmarried, knowingly marries the husband or wife of another, that 
person is guilty of a category D felony . . . .”). 
New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 639:1 (Westlaw 2010) (“A per-
son is guilty of a class B felony if, having a spouse and knowing that he is not 
legally eligible to marry, he marries another.”). 
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-1(a), (b) (Westlaw 2010) (“A married 
person is guilty of bigamy, a disorderly persons offense, if he contracts or pur-
ports to contract another marriage . . . . A person is guilty of bigamy if he con-
tracts or purports to contract marriage with another knowing that the other is 
thereby committing bigamy.”). 
New Mexico: N.M Stat Ann. art. 3, § 9 (Westlaw 2010)(“Every person 
who shall be convicted of bigamy or polygamy, shall be imprisoned not more 
than seven years nor less than two years.”); N.M. Const. art. XXI, § 1 (“Po-
lygamous or plural marriages and polygamous cohabitation are forever prohib-
ited.”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-10-1 (Westlaw 2010) (“Bigamy consists of know-
ingly entering into a marriage by or with a person who has previously contracted 
one or more marriages which have not been dissolved by death, divorce or an-
nulment. Both parties may be principals.  Whoever commits bigamy is guilty of 
a fourth degree felony.”). 
New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 255.15 (Westlaw 2010) (“A person is guilty 
of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a marriage with another 
person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living 
spouse.  Bigamy is a class E felony.”). 
North Carolina : N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-183 (Westlaw 2010) (“If any 
person, being married, shall marry any other person during the life of the former 
husband or wife, every such offender, and every person counseling, aiding or 
abetting such offender, shall be punished as a Class I felon. . . . If any person, 
being married, shall contract a marriage with any other person outside of this 
State, which marriage would be punishable as bigamous if contracted within this 
State, and shall thereafter cohabit with such person in this State, he shall be 
guilty of a felony and shall be punished as in cases of bigamy.”). 
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code 12.1-20-13(1) (Westlaw 2010) (“A per-
son who marries another person, while married to another person, is guilty of a 
class C felony.”). 
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Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.01(A), (C) (Westlaw 2010) (“No mar-
ried person shall marry another or continue to cohabit with such other person in 
this state. . . . Whoever violates this section is guilty of bigamy, a misdemeanor 
of the first degree.”). 
Oklahoma: Okla. Const. art. 1, § 2 (“Polygamous or plural marriages are 
forever prohibited.”); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 881 (Westlaw 2010) (“Every 
person who having been married to another who remains living, marries any 
other person . . . is guilty of bigamy.”); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 883 (Westlaw 
2010) (“Any person guilty of bigamy shall be guilty of a felony punishable by 
imprisonment in the State Penitentiary not exceeding five (5) years.”); Okla. 
Stat. Ann. tit 21, § 884 (Westlaw 2010) (“Any person who knowingly marries 
the husband or wife of another, in any case in which such husband or wife 
would be punishable according to the foregoing provisions, shall be guilty of a 
felony punishable by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary not exceeding five 
(5) years, or in a county jail not exceeding one (1) year, or by a fine not exceed-
ing Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment.”). 
Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.515(1), (2) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person com-
mits the crime of bigamy if the person knowingly marries or purports to marry 
another person at a time when either is lawfully married.  Bigamy is a Class C 
felony.”). 
Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4301(a), (b) (Westlaw 2010) (“A 
married person is guilty of bigamy, a misdemeanor of the second degree, if he 
contracts or purports to contract another marriage . . . . A person is guilty of big-
amy if he contracts or purports to contract marriage with another knowing that 
the other is thereby committing bigamy.”). 
Puerto Rico: P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4141 (Westlaw 2010) “Any person 
who remarries without the former marriage having been annulled or lawfully 
dissolved, shall be punished by imprisonment as provided below . . . . The pen-
alty to be imposed for this crime shall be that of imprisonment for a fixed term 
of two (2) years. Should there be aggravating circumstances, the fixed penalty 
established may be increased to a maximum of three (3) years; if there should be 
extenuating circumstances, it may be reduced to a minimum of one year.”). 
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-6-1 (Westlaw 2010) (“Every per-
son who shall be convicted of being married to another, or of cohabiting with 
another as husband and wife, having at the time a former husband or wife living, 
shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) . . . .”). 
South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-10 (Westlaw 2010) (“Any per-
son who is married who shall marry another person shall . . . [o]n conviction, be 
punished by imprisonment in the Penitentiary for not more than five years nor 
less than six months or by imprisonment in the jail for six months and by a fine 
of not less than five hundred dollars.”). 
South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22A-1 (Westlaw 2010) (“Any 
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person who, while married to another presently living person, marries any other 
person, is guilty of bigamy. . . . Bigamy is a Class 6 felony.”). 
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-301(a)(1)-(2), (c) (Westlaw 2010) 
(“A person commits bigamy who: Is married and purports to marry a person 
other than the person’s spouse in this state under circumstances that would, but 
for the person’s existing marriage, constitute a marriage; or Knows that a person 
other than the person’s spouse is married and purports to marry the person in 
this state under circumstances that would, but for the person’s existing marriage, 
constitute a marriage. . . . Bigamy is a Class A misdemeanor.”). 
Texas: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 25.01(a)(1)(A)-(B), (a)(2)(A)-(B), (b), 
(e)(1)-(2) (Westlaw 2010) (“An individual commits an offense if: he is legally 
married and he: purports to marry or does marry a person other than his spouse 
in this state, or any other state or foreign country, under circumstances that 
would, but for the actor’s prior marriage, constitute a marriage; or lives with a 
person other than his spouse in this state under the appearance of being married; 
or he knows that a married person other than his spouse is married and he: pur-
ports to marry or does marry that person in this state, or any other state or for-
eign country, under circumstances that would, but for the person’s prior mar-
riage, constitute a marriage; or lives with that person in this state under the 
appearance of being married.  For purposes of this section, ‘under the appear-
ance of being married’ means holding out that the parties are married with co-
habitation and an intent to be married by either party. . . . An offense under this 
section is a felony of the third degree, except that if at the time of the commis-
sion of the offense, the person whom the actor marries or purports to marry or 
with whom the actor lives under the appearance of being married is: 16 years of 
age or older, the offense is a felony of the second degree; or younger than 16 
years of age, the offense is a felony of the first degree.”). 
Utah: Utah Const. art. 3 (“[P]olygamous or plural marriages are forever 
prohibited.”); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101(1), (2) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person is 
guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other 
person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person or 
cohabits with another person.  Bigamy is a felony of the third degree.”). 
Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 206 (Westlaw 2010) (“A person having 
a husband or wife living who marries another person, or continues to cohabit 
with such second husband or wife in this state, shall be imprisoned not more 
than five years.”). 
Virginia : Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-362 (Westlaw 2010) (“If any person, be-
ing married, shall, during the life of the husband or wife, marry another person 
in this Commonwealth, or if the marriage with such other person take place out 
of the Commonwealth, shall thereafter cohabit with such other person in this 
Commonwealth, he or she shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.”); Va. Code Ann. 
§ 18.2-363 (Westlaw 2010) (“If any persons, resident in this Commonwealth, 
56
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss1/5
2010]    PLURAL MARRIAGE & COMMUNITY PROPERTY 89 
one of whom has a husband or wife living, shall, with the intention of returning 
to reside in this Commonwealth, go into another state or country and there in-
termarry and return to and reside in this Commonwealth cohabiting as man and 
wife, such marriage shall be governed by the same law, in all respects, as if it 
had been solemnized in this Commonwealth.”); Va. Code Ann. § 20-38.1(a)(1) 
(Westlaw 2010) (“The following marriages are prohibited: A marriage entered 
into prior to the dissolution of an earlier marriage of one of the parties.”). 
Virgin Islands: V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 361 (Westlaw 2010) (“Whoever, 
having a husband or wife, marries any other person, commits bigamy and shall 
be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.”); 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 363 (Westlaw 2010) (“Whoever knowingly and will-
fully marries the husband or wife of another, in any case in which the husband 
or wife would be punishable under the provisions of this chapter, shall be fined 
not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.”). 
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.64.010(1), (4) (Westlaw 2010) 
(“A person is guilty of bigamy if he intentionally marries or purports to marry 
another person when either person has a living spouse. . . . Bigamy is a class C 
felony.”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.020(1)(a) (Westlaw 2010) (“Marriages 
in the following cases are prohibited: When either party thereto has a wife or 
husband living at the time of such marriage;”). 
West Virginia : W. Va. Code § 61-8-1 (Westlaw 2010) (“Any person, be-
ing married, who, during the life of the former husband or wife, shall marry an-
other person in this State, or, if the marriage with such other person take place 
out of this State, shall thereafter cohabit with such other person in this State, 
shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be confined in the peni-
tentiary not less than one nor more than five years.”). 
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. § 944.05(1)(a)-(c), (2) (Westlaw 2010) (“Who-
ever does any of the following is guilty of a Class I felony: Contracts a marriage 
in this state with knowledge that his or her prior marriage is not dissolved; or 
Contracts a marriage in this state with knowledge that the prior marriage of the 
person he or she marries is not dissolved; or Cohabits in this state with a person 
whom he or she married outside this state with knowledge that his or her own 
prior marriage had not been dissolved or with knowledge that the prior marriage 
of the person he or she married had not been dissolved.  In this section ‘cohabit’ 
means to live together under the representation or appearance of being mar-
ried.”). 
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-401(a), (c) (Westlaw 2010) (“A person 
commits bigamy if, being married and knowing that his spouse is alive, he mar-
ries again. . . . Bigamy is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
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